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ABSTRACT
The author examines the influence of precedent on Supreme Court decision-making in 
Canada. Despite its importance, very little is actually known about the factors that affect 
judicial decision-making. The thesis begins by defining the doctrine of precedent, 
discusses the virtues of adhering to a policy of precedent, and provides a brief historical 
overview of the history of precedent in Canadian law. The author then reviews the three 
leading paradigms in judicial behavioural research as they relate to the influence of 
precedent. The legal model expects precedent to be among the most important factors that 
judges consider when making decisions. In contrast, the attitudinal model believes that 
judicial decisions are conditioned by the attitudes and preferences of the judges. The 
strategic model expects precedent to have some influence on judicial decision-making, in 
addition to other considerations. Based on the findings of previous research and the 
Court’s jurisprudence, the author hypothesizes that, although judges frequently cite 
precedents to justify their decisions, it rarely influences how they decide cases. To test 
this, three separate studies are conducted. The first is a content analysis of the Court’s 
judgments from 2004; the second study, which is based on the work of Brenner and 
Spaeth, examines o f the influence o f precedent in decisions that alter precedent; the third 
study applies the methodology developed by Segal and Spaeth to assess the influence of 
precedent in all cases decided since 1950. The results show, inter alia, that the majority 
of Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada decide cases based on attitudinal factors, and 
that precedent has a minimal influence on their decision-making.
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For the past decade Canadian legal scholars and political scientists have engaged in 
an intense debate over the extent to which Supreme Court decisions and Justices are 
“activist.” The term “judicial activism” is difficult to define with precision; however, it is 
usually used to describe judgments wherein the Court invalidates laws passed by 
democratically elected representatives, or when the Justices are perceived to be deciding 
cases according to their personal preferences.1 Although the “activism” debate is not new in 
Canada, it re-emerged in the mid-1980s in large part because the introduction of the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms significantly expanded the power of the judiciary to influence public 
policy. In an interview with the Globe and Mail early in 2005, Chief Justice Beverley 
McLachlin dismissed claims that the Court is “activist,” arguing that commentators use the 
term “activism” to “mask their personal distaste for a particular judgment.”2 In her opinion, 
the public is “coming to a better understanding of the shallowness” of the entire question of 
“judicial activism.”3
Whether or not one agrees with the Chief Justice, it does seem clear that it is time to 
move beyond the “judicial activism” debate, or at the very least, to redefine its terms. The 
debate over “judicial activism” should be put to rest primarily because it has proven 
academically unfruitful.4 Judicial activism does not offer a methodology that can be used to 
gain insights into judicial decisions. Instead it is a line of criticism that is inextricably tied to 
politics, evidenced by the fact that claims of judicial activism come almost exclusively from
1 See generally, Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue 
(Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2001); Sujit Choudhry and Claire Hunter, “Measuring Judicial Activism on the 
Supreme Court of Canada: A Comment on Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE,” McGill Law 
Journal 48 (2002): 525 -  560.
2 Kirk Makin, “Judicial activism debate on decline, top judge says,” The Globe and Mail. 8 Jan., 2005, A l.
3 Ibid.
4 Choudhry and Hunter, 530.
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“right-wing” commentators.5 Rather than studying the implications of judicial decisions or 
the characteristics of Charter litigants, which have been the “dominant” focus of political 
science literature in Canada, scholars need to examine the factors that influence the decision­
making behaviour of judges.
The doctrine of precedent, which holds that judges must follow previous judicial 
decisions, is widely regarded as the “fundamental principle on which judicial decision 
making is supposed to rest.”6 Yet, despite its importance, precedent has received very little 
attention from Canadian academics in the last fifty years. In contrast, American scholars have 
debated the efficacy and operation of the doctrine of precedent at length.7 Furthermore, the 
U.S. media regularly discuss precedent when there is a vacancy on the Supreme Court. For 
example, the media coverage surrounding John Roberts’ nomination as Chief Justice has 
focused considerably on Roberts’ view of precedent as it applies to controversial decisions 
such as Roe v. Wade.8
Except for a few scattered law review articles, precedent is rarely discussed by 
Canadian scholars or journalists. Perhaps more importantly, so much academic energy has 
been devoted to the “activism” debate, that there has been no attempt (that this author is 
aware of) to empirically assess the influence of precedent on the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Canada. This is surprising because American researchers have developed
5 See Neil Seeman, “Taking Judicial Activism Seriously,” Fraser Forum (August 2003): 3 -19.
6 Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, “The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of United States 
Supreme Court Justices,” American Journal of Political Science 40, no. 2 (1996): 971.
7 Michael Stokes Paulsen, “Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential 
Effect of Roe and Casey?” Yale Law Journal 109 (2000): 1535 -  1602.
8 Maura Reynolds and Richard Schmitt, ‘ Roberts is Confronted on Abortion,” Los Angeles Times 14 Sept. 
2005 [online newspaper]; accessed 17 Sept. 2005; available from
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-robertsl4sepl4,0,3591108,Ml.story?coll=la-home- 
headlines; Jeffrey Smith and Jo Becker, “Sifting Old, New Writings For Roberts’s Philosophy,” 
Washington Post 21 Aug. 2005 [online newspaper]; accessed 23 Aug. 2005; available from 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/vyp-dyn/content/articIe/2005/08/20/AR2005082001325jpf.html.
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sophisticated methodologies which make it possible to scientifically examine the influence of 
precedent.
Studying the influence of precedent on the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada 
is important for a number of reasons. Foremost among them is to test the conventional 
wisdom that precedent is the “fundamental principle” of judicial decision-making.9 Just 
because lawyers, judges, and the general public assume that precedent is important does not 
necessarily make it so. Such a bold assertion should be capable of substantiation through the 
use of replicable methodologies.
Whether, and to what extent, precedent influences judicial decision-making has 
serious implications for how the law is taught. For centuries, the study of law has emphasized 
the centrality of legal rules and doctrines, without actually testing to determine if they really 
matter when judges make decisions. As Marc Gold explains, “The study of law in Canada 
remains, to a large degree, the study of judicial opinions.”10 While judicial opinions are 
certainly an important part of a legal education, more emphasis needs to be placed on the 
behaviour of judges, rather than just examining what they say in their judgments.
The present analysis combines various methodologies to provide a comprehensive 
and multidimensional examination of the influence of precedent on the decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Canada. It begins by defining precedent and explaining how judges use 
previous decisions in their judgments. The virtues of adhering to a policy of precedent are 
then appraised, followed by a brief historical overview of the evolution of the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s approach to precedent. Chapter Two reviews the academic literature relating to 
judicial decision-making generally, and to the influence of precedent in particular. It
9 Segal and Spaeth, 971; See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1979), 69.
10 Marc Gold, “The Mask of Objectivity: Politics and Rhetoric in the Supreme Court of Canada.” Supreme 
Court Law Review 7, no. 2 (1985): 455.
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discusses the leading theoretical paradigms injudicial behavioural scholarship, and their 
applicability to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Based on the findings of previous research and the Court’s jurisprudence, I 
hypothesize that, notwithstanding what the Justices say in their opinions, precedent rarely 
influences their decisions. To test this hypothesis, the research employs a content analysis of 
the Court’s judgments, and applies the methodologies developed by American researchers to 
measure the influence of precedent on the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court to the 
judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada sincel950.
Chapter Three provides a detailed explanation of the procedures used to collect, 
classify, and analyze the data. Chapter Four presents the results and addresses the 
implications of the findings. Finally, Chapter Five concludes the analysis by discussing the 
need for addition research into the decision-making of the Supreme Court of Canada.
1. Precedent: Definition and Operationalization
At its most basic level, precedent requires judges in common law legal systems to 
respect the prior decisions of coordinate or superior courts. It derives from the ancient Latin 
maxim “stare decisis et non quieta movere,” meaning to “stand by the thing decided, and not 
to disturb settled points.”11 Black’s Law Dictionary defines stare decisis as, “the doctrine of 
precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the 
same points arise again in litigation.”12 The ensuing analysis uses both “precedent” and 
“stare decisis” to describe the judicial practice of adhering to previous decisions.
The doctrine of precedent appears to have its origins in 12th century England, during 
the reign of King Henry n. Shortly after the signing of the Magna Carta, the King appointed 
a group of judges who traveled across the English countryside adjudicating disputes
11 James Rehnquist, “The Power that Shall be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the Constitution and the 
Supreme Court,” Boston University Law Review 66 (1986): 347.
12 Black’s Law Dictionary, s.v. “stare decisis.”
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according to the existing customs and traditions of the people.13 Over time, these judges 
began to keep informal reports of their judgments that they and other judges consulted in 
future cases. This rudimentary reporting system is significant because it allowed judges to 
render similar decisions in analogous cases. The practice of following the decisions of other 
judges grew from the absence of a written code in England and the corresponding need to 
create a uniform system of laws that were common throughout the whole Kingdom.14
Although it is unclear precisely when the “modem” doctrine of stare decisis became 
established as a judicial policy, it appears to have been during the eighteenth century. 
Moreover, there is substantial agreement among scholars that, in order to develop properly, 
the practice of following precedent requires the creation of an official system of reporting 
judicial decisions.15 According to Lewis, “wherever judicial decisions are systematically 
reported their authority tends to increase.”16 Similarly, in her book, The Majesty of the Law. 
retiring U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor emphasizes the importance of 
reporting judicial decisions by devoting an entire chapter to the history of the Supreme Court 
Reports.17 Thus, the common law developed on a case-by-case basis, with judges applying 
and expanding rules contained in reports of previous judicial decisions.
The eminent American legal scholar Roscoe Pound described precedent as the 
distinguishing feature of the “common law technique” of judicial decision-making, which 
conceives of law “as experience developed by reason and reason tested and developed by 
experience.”18 According to Pound, “it is a technique of finding the grounds of decision in
13 T. Ellis Lewis, “The History of Judicial Precedent,” Law Quarterly Review 182 (1930): 208.
14 R. C. Van Caenegem, The Birth of the English Common Law. 2nd Edition (New York. Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 89 -  90.
15 Frederick Kempin Jr., “Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850,” American 
Journal of Legal History 3 (1959): 31.
16 Lewis, 215.
17 Sandra Day O’Connor. The Majesty of the Law: Reflections of a Supreme Court Justice (New York: 
Random House, 2004), see Chapter 4 at 24.
18 Roscoe Pound, “What of Stare Decisis?” Fordham Law Review 10, no. 1 (1941): 5.
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recorded judicial experience... ”19 Thus, past judicial decisions carry authority in that they 
serve to justify subsequent decisions in similar cases. As a heuristic device, precedent is not 
unique to the decision making of judges; individuals regularly consult past experiences when 
making present decisions. However, unlike most people, judges are institutionally required to 
follow their own prior decisions and those of other judges.
Under the doctrine of precedent, courts are bound to follow their own previous 
decisions as well as the decisions of superior courts in their jurisdiction. Specifically, judges 
are required to follow the ratio  decidendi, which means the “reason for deciding,” contained 
within previous judgments.20 Professor Goodhart explains that in order to determine the ratio  
decidendi of a judgment, one must identify “the material facts as seen by the judge and his 
conclusion based on them.”21 The material facts of a case are those which the judge feels are 
the most relevant to die disposition of the case.22 When the material facts of a precedent case 
are “identical” to those in a subsequent case, judges are bound to apply the ratio  from the 
first case.
In contrast, extraneous judicial statements that are unnecessary to a decision are 
considered obiter dicta, which means literally “words in passing.”23 In their opinions judges 
often speculate as to how the case would have resulted had certain facts been different. These 
types of statements are an example of obiter dicta. They are persuasive, but unlike the ratio, 
statements made in o b iter  do not bind lower courts. It should be noted that determining the 
ra tio  and obiter  of a particular judgment is not an exact science, evidenced by the fact that 
judges frequently disagree with their colleagues as to which rules are binding and which are 
not.
19 Ibid.
20 Rupert Cross. Precedent in English Law 2nd Edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 35.
21 Arthur Goodhart, “Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case,” Yale Law Journal 40, no. 2 (1930): 169.
22 Ibid.
23 Cross, 80.
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Moreover, a judge can “distinguish” a precedent if he or she feels that the prior case 
is inapplicable because it differs in some materially relevant aspect from the case presently 
under consideration. In some instances, judges will distinguish cases to avoid applying 
precedents which they do not agree with.24 The most significant departure from the doctrine 
of precedent occurs when a judge or court overrules a prior decision. Overruling a decision 
differs from distinguishing, in that the latter retains its precedential force while overruled 
decisions do not.
2. The Virtues of Stare Decisis
Following precedent is, in effect, a self-enforcing policy norm, meaning that it is not 
prescribed by any “positive” source of law such as a statute or constitution.25 Nevertheless, 
legal scholars and members of the judiciary have long maintained that adherence to precedent 
promotes important values associated with the rule of law, including fairness, stability and 
predictability. For these reasons, the doctrine of precedent is described by the legal academy 
as an essential part of judicial decision-making in a common law system.
According to its supporters, stare decisis promotes fairness by ensuring that like 
cases will be treated alike. For a legal system to be considered fair, individuals in similar 
circumstances must be subject to the same legal consequences.26 As former U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice William Douglas stated, “there will be no equal justice under law if a 
negligence rule is applied in the morning but not in the afternoon.”27 Furthermore, stare 
decisis promotes fairness by limiting judicial discretion. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution 
believed that the doctrine of precedent was one way to limit the discretion of the federal
24 See Cross, 48.
25 There has been some debate, primarily in the U.S., as to whether the judiciary is required to follow 
precedent. See John Harrison, “The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent,” Duke Law Journal 50 
(2000) 503 -  543.
26 Rehnquist, 347. Also see, “Constitutional Stare Decisis,” Harvard Law Review 103 (1990): 1349.
27 William O. Douglas, “Stare Decisis,” Columbia Law Review 49 (1949): 736.
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judiciary. As Alexander Hamilton stated in The Federalist No. 78, “to avoid an arbitrary 
discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and 
precedents... ”28 From this perspective, following precedent ensures that the outcomes of 
legal disputes depend on legal considerations and not on the personalities and proclivities of 
individual judges.
Commentators also argue that precedent imparts stability to the legal system by 
preventing dramatic changes in legal rules or doctrines. In Justice Douglas’s words, “stare 
decisis serves to take the capricious element out of law and to give stability to society.”29 
Similarly, Monaghan contends that adherence to precedent promotes “system-wide stability” 
by ensuring the survival of important governmental norms.30 While these norms may evolve 
over time, stare decisis prevents the judiciary from radically altering their content. Thus, 
stare decisis fosters stability, which, in turn, increases the public’s confidence in the law.
Furthermore, following prior judicial decisions provides predictability and continuity 
to the legal system. Former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter maintained that 
predictability is “rooted in the psychological need to satisfy reasonable expectations.”31 It is 
fundamental to the rule of law that people be able to predict the legal consequences of their 
actions. As Justice Anglin of the Supreme Court of Canada stated in a 1909 decision, “it is of 
supreme importance that people may know with certainty what the law is, and this end can 
only be attained by loyal adherence to that doctrine of stare decisis,”32 Moreover, the utility 
of transactions such as wills and contracts depends upon the ability of individuals to predict
28 Alexander Hamilton, “The Federalist No. 78,” in Terrence Ball, The Federalist (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 383.
29 Douglas, 736.
30 Henry Paul Monaghan, “Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication,” Columbia Law Review 88 
(1988): 723.
31 Helvering v. Hallock, [1940] 309 U.S. 106, 119.
32 Stuart v. Bank of Montreal, [1909] 41 S.C.R. 516 at 549.
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the applicable legal rules.33 Hence, maintaining the continuity of the law through adherence 
to precedent enables people to arrange their future affairs with certainty.
In addition to rule of law considerations, commentators have argued that adherence to 
precedent serves a number of practical purposes related to the efficient administration of the 
legal system. For example, economically oriented scholars assert that application of stare 
decisis limits a court’s agenda, thereby conserving scarce judicial decision-making 
resources.34 As Justice Cardozo observed, “the labor of judges would be increased almost to 
the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case... ”35 By preventing 
the constant reconsideration of settled legal questions, precedent economizes adjudicative 
resources, thereby allowing courts to resolve more cases.36
Another practical benefit of following stare decisis is, according to some scholars, 
that it improves decision-making. Specifically, Lee and others argue that adherence to 
precedent improves the quality of judicial decision-making because judges can draw from the 
accumulated experience and expertise of other judges.37 As Judge Easterbrook notes, 
“subjecting each judge’s work to the test of congruence with the conclusions of those 
confronting the same problem... increases... the chance of the court’s being right.”38 
Accordingly, adherence to precedent has the potential to improve judicial decision-making 
and reduce the number of erroneous judgments.
33 Rehnquist, 348.
34 Lews Komhauser, “An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis,” Chicaao-Kent Law Review 65 (1989). 
77.
35 Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921), 149.
36 Thomas R. Lee, “Stare Decisis in Economic Perspective: An Economic Analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
Doctrine of Precedent,” North Carolina Law Review 78 (2000): 648.
37 Lee, 652; “Constitutional Stare Decisis,” 1349.
38 Frank Easterbrook, “Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions,” Cornell Law Review 73 (1988): 423. 
Quoted by Lee at 652.
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3. The History of Stare Decisis in Canada
As a colony of the British Empire, Canada inherited many traditions of the common 
law, including the practice of following precedent. In fact, precedent has been an important 
feature of the Canadian legal system since before Confederation in 1867. The remainder of 
this chapter provides a brief history of the doctrine of precedent at the Supreme Court of 
Canada. The discussion is divided into three periods: 1875 to 1949, during which all 
Canadian courts were required to follow the judgments of the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council (JCPC), 1950 to 1981, when the Supreme Court achieved independence from 
the JCPC and developed its own approach to precedent; and 1982 to the present, when the 
Court was forced to reformulate how it treated previously decided cases to accommodate the 
introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
From its creation in 1875 until 1949, the Supreme Court of Canada was an inferior 
tribunal in that its decisions could be appealed to and reversed by the JCPC in London. As 
the supreme judicial body, the judgments of the JCPC bound all colonial courts that were 
subject to English law.39 Moreover, in addition to being bound by the judgments of the JCPC, 
the Supreme Court of Canada was also required to follow the judgments of the House of 
Lords, including the Lords’ policy of strictly adhering to their own precedents.40
This policy was firmly established in the case of London Street Tramways v. London 
City Council.*1 At issue was whether the Lords were bound by their previous judgments. In 
concluding that the Lords were bound by their own decisions, Lord Halsbury stated that the 
inconvenience created by an erroneous decision was minimal “compared with 
the... disastrous inconvenience — of having each question subject to being re-argued and the
39 Robins v. National Trust Co. Ltd., [1927] 2 D.L.R. 97.
40 Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Scarborough. Thomson Canada Ltd., 2004), 246, note 102.
41 London Street Tramways v. London City Council, [1894] A.C. 489 (H.L.).
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dealings of mankind rendered doubtful by reason of different decisions... ”42 Under this
approach, the decisions of the House of Lords were regarded as conclusive authorities.43 The
Privy Council, unlike the House of Lords, never accepted that it was absolutely bound by its
own decisions.44 Nevertheless, the JCPC scrupulously adhered to precedents, evidenced by
the fact that there was no instance during this time period in which it explicitly overruled a
previous decision in a constitutional case.45
The Canadian version of this policy was articulated by Duff J. of the Supreme Court
in the 1909 case of Stuart v. Bank o f Montreal. Justice Duff explained that,
This court is, of course, not a court of final resort in the sense in which 
the House of Lords is because our decisions are reviewable by the Privy 
Council; but only in very exceptional circumstances would the ... Lords 
Justices, sitting in appeal... have felt themselves at liberty to depart from 
their own previous decisions... Quite apart from this, there are, I think, 
considerations of public convenience too obvious to require statement 
which make it our duty to apply this principle to the decisions of this court.46
Justice Duff s statement is a clear indication that the Court regarded itself as absolutely
bound to follow the decisions of the JCPC. While Duff J. did not completely deny that the
Court could depart from precedent, such departures were justifiable “only in very exceptional
circumstances.” Thus, Supreme Court of Canada’s attitude toward the application of
precedent during this period paralleled the rigid, mechanistic approach which prevailed in
England.
Not all Canadians were content with the inferior status of the Supreme Court in the 
years immediately after Confederation. As one commentator observed, “In the years between 
1875 and 1949 the abolition of appeal to the Privy Council was never far from the political
42 Ibid.,
43 Cross, 106.
44 Tooth v. Power, [1891] A C. 127 (P.C.).
45 Bora Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law (Toronto: Carswell Co. Ltd., 1966), 191; see also Hogg, 247 
at note 110. Hogg notes that the “Privy Council did occasionally depart from precedent, but never admitted 
that it was doing so ” As an example, he cites the Radio Reference, [1932] A.C. 304 (P.C.) and A.G. 
Ontario (Labour Conventions), [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.).
46 Stuart v. Bank of Montreal, [1909] 41 S.C.R. 516, 535.
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iScene.”47 The Privy Council’s critics objected to having decisions of national significance 
made by a tribunal so far removed from the realities of life in Canada. They claim that their 
Lordships’ lack of familiarity with Canada’s affairs caused them to misinterpret the British 
North America Act in a manner that “produced a constitution that was nearly the reverse of 
the system of government intended by the framers of that document.”48 This unsatisfactory 
condition led to multiple attempts to abolish appeals to the Privy Council.
The first attempt occurred in 1875 as part of the act that established the Supreme 
Court of Canada. In its original form, the act included a clause that would have eliminated all 
appeals to the Privy Council. However, following a threat by the Secretary of State for 
Colonies that royal assent would be withheld, the clause was removed and replaced by one 
that recognized the right of appeal to the JCPC.49 The next attempt took place in 1888 when 
Parliament enacted an amendment to the Criminal Code providing for the abolition of 
appeals to the JCPC in all criminal matters. That amendment remained in effect for thirty- 
eight years, until it was declared invalid by the Privy Council in Nadan v. The King50
In 1933, Parliament again enacted legislation to abolish the right of appeal to the 
JCPC in criminal cases. Two years later, the Privy Council upheld this legislation in a 
decision that was “based upon the constitutional changes produced by the Statute of 
Westminster.”51 Specifically, the Statute of Westminster, which was enacted in 1931, 
conferred on the colonies the power to repeal or amend Imperial Statutes. The JCPC held that 
the legislation abolishing criminal appeals in Canada was a valid exercise of this new
47 Mark MacGuigan, “Precedent and Policy in the Supreme Court,” The Canadian Bar Review 45, no. 4 
(1967): 629.
48 William Livingston, “Abolition of Appeals from Canadian Courts to the Privy Council,” Harvard Law 
Review 64 (1950): 105; see also Alan Cairns, The Judicial Committee and Its Critics,” Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 4 (1971): 301 -  345,
49 Livingston, 105.
50 Nadan v. The King, [1926] A.C. 482 (P.C.).
51 Livingston, 107.
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power.52 Finally, the Canadian government introduced a bill in 1939 to abolish the remaining 
appeals to the JCPC. It became law in 1949 after being upheld by the Privy Council in A. G. 
Ontario v. A.G. Canada53 Since that time, the Supreme Court has been the final court of 
appeal in all matters relating to Canadian law.
Despite its newly acquired freedom, the Supreme Court continued to strictly follow 
its own precedents and those established by the Privy Council from 1949 until approximately 
the late 1950s. During this period, Donald Fouts contends that, with a few exceptions, the 
Court continued to adhere “rigorously to the doctrine of stare decisis.”54 Gradually, the Court 
relaxed its approach, and accepted that it was not absolutely bound by its own decisions or 
those of the JCPC. In Re The Farm Products Marketing Act, a case decided in 1957, the 
Supreme Court signalled for the first time its willingness to relax the rule which it had 
imposed on itself in Stuart v. Bank o f Montreal55 In his concurring opinion, Justice Rand 
stated that,
The powers of this Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction are no 
less in scope than those formerly exercised in relation to Canada 
by the Judicial Committee. From time to time the Committee has 
modified the language used by it in the attribution of legislation 
to the various heads of ss. 91 and 92... and that incident of judicial 
power must, now.. .be exercised in revising or restating those 
formulations that have come down to us.56
Despite Justice Rand’s statement, Professor Hogg notes that the first time the Court actually
refused to follow a Privy Council decision in a constitutional case did not occur until 1978.57
Perhaps the most important development to have an impact on the doctrine of
precedent in Canada during the period from 1950 to 1981 took place, ironically, in England.
52 British Coal Co. v. The King, [1935] A.C. 500 (P.C.).
53 A.G. Ontario v. A.G. Canada, [1947] A.C. 127 (P.C.).
54 Donald Fouts, “Policy-Making in the Supreme Court of Canada, 1950-1960,” in Glendon Schubert and 
David Danelski (eds.) Comparative Judicial Behavior: Cross-Cultural Studies of Political Decision-Making 
in the East and West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 261.
55 Re The Farm Products Marketing Act, [1957] S.C.R. 198; 7 D.L.R. (2d) 257.
56 Ibid., 272.
57 Hogg, 246. The case is Re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198.
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That development was the House of Lords’ Practice Statement of 1966, in which the Lords 
declared that they were prepared to “depart from previous decisions when it appears right to 
do so.”58 The Practice Statement effectively abolished the rule of absolute stare decisis that 
was created by the Lords in London Tramways Co. v. L. C. C., and followed by courts 
throughout England and Canada.59 Moreover, Gordon Bale argues that the Practice Statement 
“helped to prepare a favourable climate for such a declaration in Commonwealth legal 
circles.”60
In the years immediately after the Practice Statement, the Supreme Court of Canada 
came to accept a more flexible rule of stare decisis. This change of attitude is reflected in 
Chief Justice Laskin’s statement in Harrison v. Carswell, in which he explains that, “[t]his 
Court, above all others in this country, cannot be simply mechanistic about previous 
decisions, whatever the respect it would pay to such decisions.”61 Throughout the 1970s, the 
Court overruled or refused to follow its previous decisions on a number of occasions.62 Since 
then, the Court’s approach to stare decisis is based on the principle that no decision is 
absolutely binding.
From 1950 to 1981, the Court also formulated certain rules governing the operation 
of precedent in the Canadian legal system. The first was the hierarchical, or vertical rule of 
stare decisis, under which the decisions of the Supreme Court are binding on all “inferior” 
courts in Canada. In Woods Manufacturing v. The King, a case decided two years after 
appeals to the JCPC were completely abolished, the Court unequivocally asserted its position
58 Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent), [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234 (H.L.).
59 Cross, 107.
60 Gordon Bale, “Casting Off the Mooring Ropes of Binding Precedent” The Canadian Bar Review 58, no. 
2 (1980): 257.
61 Harrison v. Carswell, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 200, 202.
62 Hogg, 246.
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at the top of the Canadian judicial hierarchy63 Chief Justice Rinfret, speaking for the full 
court, stated that, “It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the authority of 
decisions be scrupulously respected by all courts upon which they are binding,”64
However, stare decisis does not apply horizontally to the decisions of coordinate 
courts. For instance, a decision by a local judge in Windsor is not binding on other local 
judges throughout Ontario. The same rule applies to the decisions of provincial appellate 
courts. As Chief Justice Laskin explained in Wolfv. The Queen, “A provincial appellate 
Court is not obliged, as a matter either of law or of practice, to follow the decision of the 
appellate Court of another province... ,”63 Thus, the Canadian judicial system is based on a 
hierarchical structure in which precedential authority flows vertically from the top down.
Another significant development relating to the doctrine of precedent occurred in 
1980 as the result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sellars v. The Queen. In Sellars, the 
Court fundamentally altered the traditional common law distinction between the ratio 
decidendi and obiter dicta by holding that statements made in obiter are binding on lower 
courts.66 Traditionally, obiter statements of a high court have been accorded respect by lower 
courts, but have never been considered binding.67 Whenever lower courts follow these obiter 
statements, they have done so voluntarily. Through its decision in Sellars, the Court 
significantly expanded the portion of its judgments which are considered binding on lower 
courts by altering the traditional distinction between ratio and obiter.
Sellars was convicted of murder based primarily on the evidence of an admitted 
accessory after the fact. He appealed the conviction on the ground that the trial judge failed to
63 Woods Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The King, [1951] S.C.R. 504. Stare decisis also applies in Quebec, see 
Daoust, Lalonde and Cie Ltee v. Ferland, [1932] S.C.R. 343, 351.
64 Ibid., 515.
65 Wolfv. The Queen, [1974] 47 D.L.R. (3d) 741.
66 Sellars v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 527; 110 D.L.R. (3d) 629.
67 Cross, 80.
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instruct the jury that they should be cautious in relying on this uncorroborated evidence. 
Specifically, he argued that juries should apply the same standard when considering the 
veracity of uncorroborated evidence given by accessories after the fact as is used to consider 
evidence given by accomplices.68 The trial judge ruled against Sellars and instructed the jury 
that because the witness was an accessory after the fact, “there was therefore no need to warn 
them as to the danger of accepting his uncorroborated evidence as if he were an 
accomplice.”69
After Sellar’s trial, the Supreme Court of Canada held in Paradis v. The Queen that 
the testimony of accessories after the fact was subject to the same evidentiary rules that apply 
to accomplices.70 Although this statement was obiter, the Supreme Court relied on Paradis to 
reach its decision in Sellar’s appeal. Specifically, the Court held that the trial judge erred in 
his instruction to the jury, but dismissed Sellar’s appeal because “no substantial wrong or 
miscarriage of justice resulted from the misdirection... .”71 Therefore, Sellars is significant for 
establishing that “where the Supreme Court expresses an opinion on a point of law, then such 
ruling is binding on lower Courts notwithstanding it was not absolutely necessary to rule on 
the point in order to dispose of the appeal.”72
A number of commentators initially argued that the Sellars judgment dramatically 
altered the common law in Canada. For example, discussing the effect of Sellers case in an 
article published one year after the judgment, Gilbert argued that it had the potential to 
produce a “radical change in the principle of stare decisis... ,”T3 However radical the Court’s 
decision in Sellars appeared at the time, its long-term effect has been minimal. In fact, the
68 Sellars, 528.
69 Ibid.
70 Paradis v. The Queen, [1978] S.C.R. 264.
71 Sellars, 527.
72 Ibid.
73 Geoffrey Gilbert, “Stare Decisis-Value of Obiter Dictum-Supreme Court of Canada,” The Canadian Bar 
Review 60 (1982): 375.
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Court has stated in subsequent decisions that obiter dicta comments do not bind lower 
courts.74
From 1982 to the present, the Supreme Court substantially refined its approach to 
stare decisis. In particular, the changes produced by the introduction of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 forced the Court to reconsider its jurisprudence in a number 
of areas of law. While the Court continued to believe that “compelling circumstances” were 
necessary to justify departing from a prior decision, the Justices have also indicated that they 
consider the Charter a sufficient basis on which to alter precedent. For example, in Therens, 
the majority effectively overruled an earlier decision governing the interpretation of the term 
“detained” in the Bill of Rights, by refusing to apply it in cases involving the Charter.75 
Moreover, in his dissenting opinion in R.. v. Bernard, Chief Justice Dickson stated that the 
“special mandate” of the Charter requires the Court to reconsider, and where necessary, to 
overrule its previous decisions.76 Thus, pre-Charter decisions that fail to respect 
constitutionally entrenched values are subject to reversal by the Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Dickson’s opinion in Bernard, which was joined by Lamer J., argued 
that the Court should overrule its pre-Charter decision in Leary v. The Queen. The decision in 
Leary introduced the distinction between “general” and “specific” intent as it relates to self- 
induced intoxication.77 Dickson C. J. maintained that Leary imposes a form of absolute 
liability on intoxicated offenders which violates the Charter right to be presumed innocent
74 See Manitoba Provincial Judges Association v. Manitoba (Minister of Justice), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 at par. 
168. Chief Justice Lamer stated that, “the remarks of Le Dam J. were strictly obiter dicta, and do not bind 
courts below...”
75 R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, 639 -  640.
76 R. v. Bernard, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833, 851.
77 Leary v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 29.
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until proven guilty.78 However, a majority of the Justices disagreed and voted to uphold the 
rule established in Leary.
In arguing that Leary should be overruled, Dickson C. J. listed three factors in 
addition to the Charter, which would justify the Court departing from a previous decision.
These factors are: (1) the decision has been “attenuated” by subsequent decisions;79 (2) the 
decision creates uncertainty;80 (3) the decision should not be overruled where the effect of 
overruling would be to expand criminal liability.81 Although the factors listed by Dickson 
C. J. are not exhaustive, Bernard was the first time the Court made a serious effort to establish 
rules governing the alteration of precedent. These factors were adopted by a majority of the 
Justices in Chaulk82 and subsequently refined in B (K.G.).*3 In addition to the factors listed in 
Bernard, the Court has also stated that it would be less willing to alter decisions arrived at 
after full argument and deliberation.84
The Court added to this list more recently in R. v. Robinson, offering five reasons 
why the evidentiary rules established in Beard should be overruled. For the majority, Lamer 
C.J. explained that Beard should be overruled because: (1) there were “strong dissenting 
opinions” in subsequent cases involving the application of the Beard rules; (2) the rules have 
not been followed consistently by lower courts; (3) developments in other jurisdictions 
support overruling; (4) there is considerable academic commentary in favour of overruling;
(5) the rules are inconsistent with the Charter.85 Most of the factors listed by Lamer C.J. 
relate either directly or indirectly to those which were originally stated in Bernard. These 





82 R. v. Chaulk, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303.
83 R. v. B. (K.G.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740.
84 Clark v. Canadian National Railway Co., [1988] 2 S.C.R. 680.
85 R. v. Robinson, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 683.
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The Supreme Court has also indicated that it will alter common law rules when 
necessary to keep the law relevant to the needs of a constantly changing society. In R.. v. 
Salituro, a unanimous Court stated its willingness to “adapt and develop common law rules 
to reflect changing circumstances in society at large.”86 Moreover, the Court approvingly 
referred to the Practice Statement in support of the proposition that “too rigid adherence to 
precedent may lead to injustice... and also unduly restrict the proper development of law.”87 
Accordingly, it is the duty of the Supreme Court to strike the proper balance between the 
principle of continuity in the law, and the need to ensure the law develops over time. As a 
general rule, the Court will make “slow” and “incremental” changes to the common law, 
while leaving “complex” changes to the legislature.88 Taken together, these rules form the 
basis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s current approach to the doctrine of precedent.
From a comparative perspective, the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to 
precedent is similar to the approaches followed by the High Court of Australia and the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Shortly after appeals to the JCPC were abolished, the High Court of 
Australia asserted that it was no longer bound by its previous decisions or by the decisions of 
the Privy Council.89 The High Court, like the Supreme Court of Canada, believes that 
appellate courts have a “creative role” to play in adapting the law to new social conditions, 
which, in turn, requires that they have the power to depart from previous decisions.90
The general attitude of the Australian High Court toward the doctrine of precedent is 
perhaps captured best by the comments of Justice Murphy in Queensland v. The 
Commonwealth. In particular, Justice Murphy stated that, “past judicial decisions should not
R. v. Salituro. [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654, 666.
87 Ibid.
Ibid., 666 -  668.
89 Queensland v. Commonwealth, [1977] 139 C.L.R. 585, 605 (H.C. Aust.).
90 Viro v. The Queen, [1978] 141 C.L.R. 88 (H.C. Aust.).
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be elevated to a status higher than the Constitution itself.”91 Thus, while judicial decisions 
may be important, they are not immutable. The Australian High Court has also developed a 
four-factor test used to determine whether a precedent should be overruled.92 This test 
resembles the one developed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Bernard, but has been 
described as “more theoretically sound.”94
The United States Supreme Court has taken a similar approach to the doctrine of 
precedent. Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that stare decisis is “usually the 
wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be 
settled than that it be settled right.”94 However, precedent is not a “universal inexorable 
command,” and the Court will depart from its previous decisions when it is appropriate to do 
so.95 In fact, the Court has overruled numerous precedents throughout its over two-hundred- 
year history.96
This is especially true of cases involving the Federal Constitution, “where correction 
through legislative action is practically impossible... ”97 By design, amending the U. S. 
Constitution is an extremely difficult task. For that reason, the Supreme Court has been more 
willing to overrule its Constitutional decisions compared to its statutory precedents which 
Congress can easily “correct” through ordinary legislation.98 The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
attitude toward constitutional precedents is perhaps characterized best by the famous maxim 
first stated by Justice Douglas, advising his colleagues to remember that it is a Constitution 
which judges “swore to support and defend, not the gloss which [their] predecessors may
91 Queensland, 610.
92 Johnv. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, [1989] 166 C.L.R. 417 (H.C. Aust.).
93 Richard Haigh, “A Kindler, Gentler Supreme Court? The Case of Bums and the need for a Principled 
Approach to Overruling,” Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 14 (2001): 145 at note 21.
94 Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., [1932] 285 U.S. 393, 406 (Brandeis dissenting).
95 Ibid.
96 See Congress, House, Supreme Court Decisions Overruled by Subsequent Decision, report prepared by 
the Congressional Research Service (Washington D C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), 2243 -  2256.
97 Burnet, 406.
98 Payne v. Tennessee, [1991] 501 U.S. 808, 827.
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have put on it.”99 In contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada does not explicitly distinguish 
between constitutional and statutory precedents.
One exception to this policy concerns decisions that have become “so embedded” in 
the U.S. system of government, such as Roe v. Wade, “that return is no longer possible.”100 
Because of their national significance, these cases are regarded as being beyond the power of 
the courts to overturn. Moreover, the Court will also strictly adhere to precedents in cases 
involving property and contract rights, “where reliance interests are involved.”101 In addition 
to these considerations, the U.S. Supreme Court examines whether a precedent has proven 
“unworkable,” or been undermined by other legal/factual developments to warrant it being 
overruled.102
Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada’s practices relating to precedent are similar to 
those followed by the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court and the High Court of 
Australia. In particular, all three tribunals subscribe to a flexible version of stare decisis, 
which, while emphasizing the need for continuity in the law, holds that no decision is 
beyond review. Notwithstanding what the Supreme Court of Canada has said regarding 
the application of stare decisis, its approach remains largely underdeveloped relative to 
those of the U.S. and Australian Supreme Courts.
The failure to articulate a clear, consistent doctrine of precedent has generated 
considerable confusion among academics and members of the legal community in 
Canada. For example, in recent years, scholars have noted that the Supreme Court of Canada
99 Douglas, 736.
100 See Panned Parenthood of Southeastern PA. v. Casey, [1992] 505 U.S. 833, 857. In Casey, the majority 
upheld the central holding of Roe v. Wade.
101 Swift & Co. v. Wickham, [1965] 382 U.S. I l l ,  116.
102 Casey, 857.
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has been extremely reluctant to explicitly overrule its previous decisions.103 Instead of 
overruling, Richard Haigh explains, the Court “almost always engagefs] in hair splitting and 
tortured reasoning in an attempt to distinguish its earlier precedents.”104
To add to the confusion, the Court frequently overrules or alters precedent without 
saying so, or providing reasons why.105 On the rare occasions when the Court does explicitly 
overrule, it has been described as “so dismissive of its own earlier precedent as to lead one to 
wonder whether old cases have any value whatsoever.”106 The inquiry will now examine the 
“value” of “old cases” by examining the influence of precedent on the decision-making of the 
Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada.
103 David Vaver, “Developments in Contract Law: Chief Justice Laskin and the Law of Contracts,” 
Supreme Court Law Review 7, no. 1 (1985): 133; see generally Haigh, 139 -  159.
104 Haigh, 141.
105 See United States v. Bums, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283. In Bums, the Court overruled its decisions in Kindler 
v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, and Re Ng Extradition, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858, without 
explicitly announcing that the decisions were overruled.
10<f Haigh, 141.
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CHAPTER 2 
Review of the Literature 
In order to assess the influence of precedent, it is first necessary for researchers to 
examine the general features of judicial decision-making behaviour. Throughout the latter 
half of the 20th century, social scientists and legal scholars developed a number of theoretical 
models that attempt to explain the factors influencing judicial decision-making. These 
theories can be classified into three broad explanatory models: the legal model; the strategic 
(or moderate) model; and the attitudinal model.
The legal model, which dominated jurisprudential scholarship until the mid-20th 
century, holds that precedent is one of the most important factors that judges consider in 
making their decisions. At the other end of the theoretical spectrum is the attitudinal model, 
which theorizes that, at the level of the Supreme Court, precedent has almost no influence on 
rulings of the justices. According to the attitudinal model, Supreme Court justices decide 
cases based on their own personal values and policy preferences. Both the legal and 
attitudinal models seek to parsimoniously explain and predict judicial behaviour by focusing 
on the impact of a particular set of variables considered to be important. Between these two 
extremes is the strategic model, which leaves some room for the influence of precedent in 
addition to other variables. While the moderate perspective will be briefly examined, this 
review will focus primarily on the legal and attitudinal models, because they are the leading 
paradigms injudicial behaviour scholarship and most relevant to the present inquiry.
1. The Legal Model
The belief that precedent plays a pivotal role in determining case outcomes derives 
from the tenets of the legal model of judicial behaviour. According to the legal model, judges 
decide cases based on factors including, case facts, the plain meaning of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
24
constitutional/statutory texts, legislative intent, canons of construction, and precedent.1 The 
premise underlying the legal model is that by impartially applying these “legal rules,” or 
“neutral principles,” to the facts of the case under consideration, judges can arrive at an 
objectively correct decision.2 According to the legal model, the judicial function is to 
“discover” the law as it exists, rather than “create” it anew.
Perhaps not surprisingly, support for the legal model comes almost exclusively from 
judges and members of the legal academy. This is to be expected given that the legal 
profession requires its practitioners to understand and use legal rules such as precedent. 
Professor Frederick Schauer has argued that adherents of the legal model espouse an 
“idealized” view of judging that emphasizes judicial objectivity and infallibility.3 He explains 
that this view is “cultivated by the judiciary, celebrated by the culture of lawyers and law 
schools, and accepted by most members of the public.”4 It is common for proponents of the 
legal model to assert that judges are objective, impartial, and dispassionate in rendering their 
judgments. Whether or not this is true, the idealized view of the judicial function represents 
an important philosophical assumption underlying the legal model.
According to the legal model, the process of applying legal rules simply requires 
judges to use syllogistic logic and analogous reasoning. Describing this process, Professor 
Edward Levi states that, “a proposition descriptive of the first case is made into a rule of law
1 Richard A. Brisbon Jr., “Slaying the Dragon: Segal, Spaeth and the Function of Law in Supreme Court 
Decision Making,” American Journal of Political Science 40, no. 4 (1996): 1005.
2 Glenn A. Phelps and John G. Gates, “The Myth of Jurisprudence: Interpretive Theory in the 
Constitutional Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan,” Santa Clara Law Review 31, no. 2 
(1991):568; Herbert Wechsler, “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,” Harvard Law Review 
73, no. 1 (1959): 1-35; see also Re AG. Quebec and A.G. Canada, [1982] 140 D.L.R. (3d) 385 at 393. The 
Court stated that, “Like legal rules, [conventional rules] are positive rules the existence of which has to be 
ascertained by reference to objective standards.”
3 Frederick Schauer, “Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior,” 
University of Cincinnati Law Review 68 (2000): 624 [hereinafter Schauer, “Incentives,”]; Jeffrey Segal and 
Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 17 -  18. [hereinafter Segal and Spaeth, The Attitudinal Model] Segal and Spaeth describe this 
phenomenon as the “mythology of judging.”
4 Schauer, “Incentives,” 624.
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and then applied to the next similar situation.”5 Similarly, the late U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Cardozo explained that in deciding cases, judges must search through the existing body of 
precedents to find cases with facts and legal questions analogous to those presently under 
consideration. From this perspective, judges simply “match the colors of the case at hand 
against the colors of the many sample cases spread out upon their desk. The sample nearest in 
shade supplies the applicable rule.”6 Therefore, proponents of the legal model maintain that 
when a judge determines that two cases are factually and legally similar, the rule of law in the 
first case is syllogistically applied to the second case. Although Levi and Cardozo were not 
supporters of the legal model, their accounts of the process through which judges apply legal 
rules are illustrative of the legalist position.
The notion that objectively correct answers to legal problems can be discerned 
through “mechanical” application of “neutral” principles, including precedent, traces its 
origins to the work of the renowned English jurist Sir William Blackstone. For Blackstone, 
judges are the “depositary of the laws; the living oracles,” who must decide cases “not 
according to [their] own private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of 
the land.”7 Blackstone’s description of judges as “living oracles” implies that they have 
supernatural, or at least superhuman abilities, and therefore reflects the previously noted 
tendency among supporters of the legal model to hold an “idealized” view of the judiciary.
According to Blackstone, judges are not empowered to pronounce new laws, but 
rather to “maintain and expound” those already in existence.8 The only exception to this rule 
is in the case of laws that are “flatly absurd or unjust.”9 Moreover, judges are under no
5 Edward H. Levi, Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 1.
6 Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921), 20.
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obligation to follow laws that are contrary to reason or the divine law. For Blackstone, “it is 
an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points come again in 
litigation.”10 He concludes that, “precedents and rules must be followed,” if for no other 
reason than “to keep the scale of justice even and steady... ,”n Thus, Blackstone believes that 
fairness requires judges to mechanically apply previously announced legal principles to 
present situations. Furthermore, judges exercise almost no discretion in the application of 
these principles.
Few contemporary commentators accept Blackstone’s description as an exhaustive 
explanation of how judges decide cases. However, neo-legalist scholars continue to consider 
traditional legal factors as central to the judicial decision-making process. Among them is 
Ronald Dworkin, who is perhaps this generation’s most influential legal scholar. In his work, 
Taking Rights Seriously. Dworkin challenges the position that judges are free, and in fact 
required, to exercise discretion in adjudicating disputes. According to Dworkin, although 
precedents only “incline” judges toward certain results, they are “not free to pick and choose 
amongst the principles and policies” that make up the doctrine of stare decisis.12 Even in 
“hard cases” where there are no existing precedents, judges must “discover what the rights of 
the parties are,” and not invent new ones. He insists that, “judges do not have discretion in 
the matter of principles... ,”13
Based on Dworkin’s approach, precedent may exert two types of force on subsequent 
decisions: an “enactment force” relating to its effect on future cases “covered by its exact 
words;” and a “gravitational force,” which refers to its effect on cases that are not directly
10 Ibid, 69.
11 Ibid.
12 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 38.
13 Ibid., 47.
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covered by the language of the precedent.14 The “gravitational force” of a precedent is 
justified in terms of fairness; that is, treating like cases alike. As Dworkin explains, “A 
precedent is the report of an earlier political decision; the very fact of that decision, as a piece 
of political history, provides some reason for deciding other cases in a similar way.”15 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Dworkin uses a mythological judge named “Hercules” to 
illustrate how judges decide cases. Thus, Dworkin’s account of the judicial decision-making 
process is similar in many ways to Blackstone’s description. Specifically, both hold an 
“idealized” view of judging which is based on file belief that judges exercise almost no 
discretion in the application of legal rules such as precedent.
The legal model also receives support from many scholars and jurists who identify 
themselves as followers of “interpretivism.” “Interpretivism,” which is sometimes referred to 
as “originaiism,” “intentionalism,” or “textualism,” is a theory of constitutional interpretation 
that requires judges to locate the meaning of constitutional provisions in the text, the authors’ 
intent, and in previous judicial decisions.16 According to “interpretivists,” constitutional texts 
have a fixed and definite meaning which can be ascertained by examining the 
aforementioned sources. An interpretation that does not derive from these sources is regarded 
as an illegitimate exercise of judicial power. As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia
14 Ibid., 113; see also, David Pannick, “A Note on Dworkin and Precedent,” Modem Law Review 43, no. 1 
(1980): 37.
15 Dworkin, 133; see also Schauer, “Precedent,” 571. Prof. Schauer explains, “The previous treatment of 
occurrence X in manner Y constitutes, solely because of its historical pedigree, a reason for treating X in 
manner Y if and when X again occurs.”
16 See Raoul Berger, “Some Reflections on Interpretivism,” George Washington Law Review 55 (1986): 1 
-  16; H. Jefferson Powell, “Rules for Originalists,” Virginia Law Review 73 (1987): 659 -  699; Daniel 
Farber, “The Originaiism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed,” Ohio State Law Journal 49 (1989): 1085 -  
1106.
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argues, “interpretivism” establishes an objective “criterion that is conceptually quite separate 
from the preferences of the judge...,”17
The theory of “interpretivism” emerged in the United States during the 1980s as a 
conservative reaction against the perceived “liberal-activism” of the Supreme Court under the 
leadership of Chief Justices Earl Warren and Warren Burger. Former U.S. Attorney General 
Edwin Meese described the Warren and Burger eras as a “a quarter century of judicial 
activism, in which the text of the Constitution, precedent, and certainty were cast aside in 
favor of the wild flings of judicial fancy... ,”18 Meese and other critics claimed that the Court 
had overstepped its authority by “creating” rights, such as abortion and the Miranda 
warnings, which have no textual or historical foundation in the Constitution.19 Thus, 
“interpretivism” was designed to limit the discretion of judges, and in particular, the ability of 
the judiciary to fundamentally alter the meaning of the Constitution.
While “interpretivism” enjoys considerable support among legal scholars and 
members of the Federal judiciary in the U.S., its reception has been far less favourable in 
Canada. Since the adoption of die Charter, a relatively small group of scholars has used the 
“interpretivist” framework to critique the work of the Supreme Court.20 Two of the Court’s 
most vocal “interpretivist” critics, professors Morton and Knopff, argue that the Justices have 
interpreted the Charter according to their personal values without regard for text or the 
intention of its drafters. According to them, the Court follows a “flexible” approach to 
Charter interpretation, which is “of the sort that allows changing white in to black (or oaks
17 Antonin Scalia, “Originaiism: The Lesser Evil,” Cincinnati Law Review 57 (1989): 864. Also see 
Antonin Scalia, “The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,” University of Chicago Law Review 56 (1989): 1175 
-  1188.
18 Edwin Meese III, “A Return to Constitutional Interpretation from Judicial Law-Making,” New York Law 
School Review 40 (1996): 925.
19 Ibid.
20 For a discussion of “interpretivism” in Canada, see K. Michael Stephens, “Fidelity to Fundamental 
Justice: An Originalist Construction of Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,” 
National Journal of Constitutional Law 13, no. 2 (2002): 183 -  244.
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into poplars)... ”21 Morton and Knopff maintain that the Court has legitimized this flexibility 
by importing the “living tree” doctrine into the realm of Charter interpretation.
The “living tree” analogy was first used in Canadian law by Lord Sankey of the JCPC 
in a case which dealt with whether women were considered “persons” under the B.N.A. Act 
1867.22 Traditionally, the legal definition of a “person” was restricted to men. In deciding that 
women were "persons,” Lord Sankey stated that their Lordships do not desire “to cut down 
the provisions of the [B.N. A] Act by a narrow and technical construction, but rather to give 
it a large and liberal interpretation... ,”23 Moreover, Lord Sankey described the Constitution 
as a “living tree,” which must be “capable of growth and expansion within its natural 
limits.”24
The Supreme Court has used the "living tree” doctrine since its first Charter decision 
to justify progressively interpreting rights and freedoms. As Justice Estey explained in Law 
Society o f Upper Canada v. Skapinker, “Narrow and technical interpretation, if not 
modulated by a sense of the unknowns of the future, can stunt the growth of the law and 
hence the community it serves.”25 For Morton and Knopff, this approach undermines the 
purpose of the constitutional amending procedures, and “makes a mockery of the very 
purpose of a written constitution.”26 As a solution, they advise the Court to adopt an 
“interpretive” method of interpretation that is faithful to the text and history of the Charter.
As previously noted, support for the legal model is largely limited to legal 
commentators and members of the judiciary. In contrast, social scientists have been far more
21 F.L. Morton and Rainer Knopff, “Permanence and Change in a Written Constitution: The ‘Living Tree’ 
Doctrine and the Charter of Rights,” Supreme Court Law Review l(2d) (1990). 545.
22 Edwards v. A.G. Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.).
23 Ibid., 136.
24 Ibid.
25 Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, 366.
26 Morton and Knopff, 545.
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sceptical of the utility of the legal model to explain the process of judicial decision-making.27 
Prior to the 1990s, studies of precedent, like most legal subjects, were generally doctrinal and 
descriptive in design.28 Spaeth and Segal suggest that the paucity of empirical research is the 
product of difficulties associated with creating testable hypotheses about precedent and the 
legal model that meet the scientific standard of “falsifiability.”29
Another reason for the lack of empirical research is the resistance of the legal 
academy to the use of social science methodologies to study the work of judges. Choudhry 
and Hunter argue that “one of the great shortcomings of Canadian legal scholarship” is its 
failure to “engage with political scientists... .”30 In recent years, empirical research conducted 
by American scholars has yielded mixed results on the influence of precedent, and the 
explanatory power of the legal model as a whole.
Research has shown that the judgments of the Canadian and U.S. Supreme Courts are 
replete with citations to, and arguments from, precedent-setting cases. This suggests, prima 
facie, that precedent matters, at least to the Justices. For example, based on her analysis of the 
“interpretive resources” used by die U.S. Supreme Court during the 1996 Term, Schacter 
concluded that, “judicial opinions rank with statutory language as the most frequently cited 
resource.”31 In another study, Phelps and Gates conducted a content analysis of the written
27 For an example of this skepticism, see Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, “The Influence of Stare 
Decisis on the Votes of United States Supreme Court Justices,” American Jonmal of Political Science 40, 
no. 2 (1996): 971 -  998. [hereinafter Segal and Spaeth, “The Influence of Stare Decisis,”]
28 For Canadian examples, see Mark MacGuigan, “Precedent and Policy in the Supreme Court," The 
Canadian Bar Review 45 (1967): 627 -  665; J. N. Lyon, “Drybones and Stare Decisis,” McGill Law 
Journal 17 (1971): 594 -  622; George F. Curtis, “Stare Decisis at Common Law in Canada,” University of 
British Columbia Law Review 12 (1978): 1 -  14.
29 Harold Spaeth and Jeffrey Segal, Majority Rule or Minority Will: Adherence to Precedent on the U.S. 
Supreme Court (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 314. [hereinafter Spaeth and Segal, 
Majority Rulel
30 Sujit Choudhry and Claire Hunter, “Measuring Judicial Activism on the Supreme Court of Canada: A 
Comment on Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE,” McGill Law Journal 48 (2003): 530.
31 Jane S. Schacter, “The Confounding Common Law Originaiism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond,” Stanford Law Review 39, no.
1 (1998): 28.
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majority opinions of Justices Brennan and Rehnquist, and determined that over 80 per cent of 
the constitutional arguments raised by both Justices were based on precedent.32
Similarly, in his analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s published judgments, 
Peter McCormick found that the Justices referred to 1400 judicial decisions during the 2003 
term, which was more than any other source.33 Other Canadian researchers have tried to 
assess the “influence” of past and current members of the Supreme Court by statistically 
analyzing case citation patterns.34 Moreover, the Court’s use of foreign precedents, especially 
those of its American counterpart, has been the focus of considerable research.35 It is 
apparent from this research that precedent is an important part of the “content” of judicial 
decisions at the appellant level in Canada and the U.S.
While these studies show that judges frequently rely on precedent as an authority on 
which to base their decisions, they do not demonstrate that precedent actually influences the 
justices’ votes. As Spaeth and Segal explain in their 1999 empirical study of precedent, 
simply counting citations “turns stare decisis into a trivial concept, at least for explanatory 
purposes.”36 After all, institutional norms require judges to justify their decisions with 
precedents. Simply citing precedents does not necessarily mean that they are the “cause” of a 
judicial decision. For their study, Segal and Spaeth defined “influence” as the ability to make 
someone do something that they otherwise would not have done.37 Accordingly, a claim that
32 Phelps and Gates, 590.
33 Peter McCormick, “The Judges and the Journals: Citation of Periodical Literature by the Supreme Court 
of Canada, 1985 -  2004,” The Canadian Bar Review 83 (2004): 638.
34 See generally, Peter McCormick, “The Supreme Court Cites the Supreme Court: Follow-Up Citation on 
the Supreme Court of Canada, 1989-1993,” Osgood Hall Law Journal 33, no. 3 (1995): 453-472.
35 See generally, Christopher P. Manfredi, “The Use of United States Decisions by the Supreme Court of 
Canada Under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 23, no. 3 (1990): 
499-518; S.I. Bushnell, “The Use of American Cases,” University of New Brunswick Law Journal 35 
(1986): 157 -18 1 .
36 Spaeth and Segal, Majority Rule. 6.
37 Ibid, 23.
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precedent influenced a decision requires that the decision be different from what would have 
been decided if the precedent did not exist.
To measure the “influence” of precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court, they examined 
the voting behaviour of dissenting judges in “landmark” cases and their “progeny.” 
Specifically, Segal and Spaeth operationally defined “precedential influence” as “the extent 
to which judges who disagree with a precedent move toward that position in subsequent 
cases.”38 A dissenting vote in a precedent-setting case is considered a judge’s “revealed 
preference,” because it is a manifestation of his or her preferred outcome.39 Thus, continuing 
to vote against the precedent in subsequent cases is considered “preferential” behaviour, 
while switching in favour of it is attributed to the influence of precedent. Although 
recognizing that other variables may be responsible for producing the observed change in 
judicial preference, Segal and Spaeth believe their approach provides a valid and reliable 
measure of the influence of precedent.
Based on a comprehensive examination of judicial voting behaviour throughout the 
Court’s history, Segal and Spaeth concluded that the Justices are “rarely influenced by stare 
decisis,”40 Of the 2425 votes in their data set, only 288, or 11.9 per cent, were classified as 
“precedential.”41 In their earlier research based on the same methodology, Segal and Spaeth 
found that the justices switched to the position established in the precedent from which they 
dissented a mere 9.2% of the time.42 Their data indicate that, with the exceptions of Stewart 
and Powell, the Justices votes were “overwhelmingly supportive” of their original
38 Ibid., 5.
39 Segal and Spaeth, “The Influence of Stare Decisis,” 975; Ainartya Sen, “Behaviour and the Concept of 
Preference,” Economica 40 (1973): 241 -  259.
40 Spaeth and Segal, Majority Rule. 288.
41 Ibid.
42 Segal and Spaeth, “The Influence of Stare Decisis,” 983.
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preferences.43 In fact, the Justices voted consistently with their original preferences at a 
minimum rate of at least 80 percent.44
In another study, Brenner and Spaeth examined the extent to which stare decisis 
influences the votes of Justices in cases where the U.S. Supreme Court has altered precedent. 
They assumed that when a judge votes to overrule or alter a precedent, his or her behaviour 
conflicts with the legal model.45 While acknowledging that some nonconformity to precedent 
is permissible under a “lax” policy of stare decisis, Brenner and Spaeth argue that they were 
“compelled to make this assumption in order to test the legal model.”46 Thus, a Justice 
conforms to the legal model by either voting with the majority in the altered decision and 
dissenting from its altering in a subsequent decision, or by dissenting in both the altered and 
altering decisions. Using this methodology, Brenner and Spaeth failed to uncover evidence in 
support of the position advanced by proponents of the legal model that precedent has a 
substantial influence on judicial decision-making.47 Taken together, these empirical studies 
indicate that precedent, which is a central component of the legal model, has limited 
influence on the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.
In the absence of empirical evidence, it is difficult to know with any certainty the 
extent to which Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada are influenced by precedent in their 
decision-making. However, there are reasons to expect that legal factors exert a similar 
degree of influence on American and Canadian judges. The first reason is that all judges are 
humans, meaning that they have individual values, attitudes, and tendencies, which are bound
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Saul Brenner and Harold J. Spaeth, Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of Precedent on the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 1946-1992 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 73. [hereinafter Brenner and Spaeth, 
Stare Indecisis]
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.; See Donald R. Songer and Stefanie A. Lindquist, “Not the Whole Story: The Impact of Justices’ 
Values on Supreme Court Decision Making,” American Journal of Political Science 40, no. 4 (1996): 1061. 
These researchers found that precedent did influence the Justices in “some categories of cases...”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
34
to influence their decision-making.48 As Chief Justice McLachlin stated in a 2004 speech, 
“Judges are human. They are not living oracles.”49 Her remark was intended to break down 
the idealized image of judges and show that judicial decision-making is governed by the 
same principles that affect all human decision-making.
Tversky and Kahneman have argued that when faced with a decision-making 
situation, individuals employ a “decision frame,” which refers to the “decision-maker’s 
conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice.”50 
Experimental research demonstrated that individuals will often rely on a biased “decision 
frame” by considering only those factors which support their preferred outcome.51 There is 
no reason to believe that judges are any more or less influenced by their psychological traits 
and biases than other individuals.
Another reason to doubt the explanatory power of the legal model is the inherent 
generality of statutory and constitutional language. Most legal terms, like ordinary words, 
have a range of possible meanings depending on the context within which they are used. 
However, the language used in many constitutional texts is particularly general and 
imprecise, which makes it extremely difficult forjudges to agree upon a definition for terms 
such as “unreasonable search and seizure” or “cruel and unusual treatment.” Chief Justice 
McLachlin has stated that “the broad, general language of the Charter permits a variety of 
interpretations and leaves judges no choice but to infuse their own values... ” in deciding
48 Jerome Frank, “Are Judges Human?” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 80 (1931): 17 -  53.
49 Beverley McLachlin, “Judging in a Democratic State,” Sixth Templeton Lecture on Democracy, 
University of Manitoba, 3 June 2004, online, available from http://www.scc- 
csc.gc.ca/AboutCourt/judges/speeches/DemocraticState e.asp.
50 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” 
Science 211 (1981): 453.
51 Ibid.
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cases.52 This statement conflicts with the legalist position that legal texts have a “fixed” and 
“determinant” meaning.
Furthermore, the individual characteristics of judges combined with the 
indeterminacy of legal language may explain why judges regularly author separate opinions. 
According to the legal model, a group of judges should be able to examine the same facts, 
apply the same legal rules, and arrive at the same conclusion. However, as Maclvor has 
argued, “the frequency of dissenting (and concurring) opinions on the Supreme Court belies 
the suggestion that judges mechanically apply impartial rules of construction or precedential 
dogma.”53 Nevertheless, the absence of empirical evidence makes it premature to completely 
discount the influence of legal factors on the decision-making of Supreme Court Justices in 
Canada.
2. The Strategic (Moderate) Model
Conversely, the strategic model of judicial behaviour holds that precedent does 
influence judges, in addition to other legal, institutional, and personal factors.54 In contrast to 
the legal model, which is predicated on the notion that legal rules (i.e. precedent) determine 
judicial preferences, the strategic approach maintains that precedent constrains judges’ ability 
to vote according to their personal preferences. Proponents of the strategic model reject the 
mythological view of judging espoused by neo-legalists, preferring instead to consider judges 
as strategic actors who seek to maximize their own preferences.55 In attempting to maximize 
their preferences, judges are constrained by institutional rules and norms, as well as by the 
actions of other judges. While strategic scholars accept the attitudinalist position that
52 Beverley McLachlin, “The Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Judicial Perspective,” University of 
British Columbia Law Review 23 (1989): 583.
53 Heather Maclvor, Canadian Politics and Government in the Charter Era (Toronto: Thomson Canada Ltd., 
2006), 103.
54 For a detailed discussion of the legal moderate position, see Nancy Maveety, ed., The Pioneers of  
Judicial Behavior (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 193.
55 Schauer, “Incentives,” 615; See Richard Posner, “What do Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing 
Everybody Else Does),” Supreme Court Economic Review 3 (1994): 1.
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personal preferences are important, they point to the interaction of preferences with collegial 
choice, institutional norms, and opinion formation variables.56
The intellectual antecedents of the moderate model are economic and social 
psychological theories predicated on the assumptions of human rationality and utility 
maximization. Glendon Schubert is widely regarded as the first social scientist to apply 
economic and social psychological models to the study of judicial behaviour. In his 
groundbreaking book, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior. Schubert used game theory 
to analyze the decisions of Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court.57 At that time, game theory 
was relatively new in the social sciences, and was used almost exclusively to examine 
economic phenomena Game theoretic models, such as the prisoner’s dilemma, are used to 
predict the behaviour of rational actors in a specified decision-making environment. The goal 
of the actors is to obtain for themselves the “maximum share of utility consistent with the 
minimum risk of receiving a lesser or no share at all.”58
In two-player games, the interests of the actors are assumed to be in conflict; 
however, if there are more than two players, it is in the interests of two or more actors to 
cooperate and form a coalition in order to maximize their joint utility. Schubert argued that in 
order to maximize their utility, Supreme Court Justices had to first recognize their 
interdependency.59 Schubert was referring to the fact that appellate court judges need the 
support of other judges in order to form a majority coalition. Hence, their decisions depend, 
to a certain extent, on the decisions of other judges. Although many legal scholars initially 
criticized the use of game theory, Schubert’s work is now regarded as “pioneering” for
56 Maveety, 193.
57 Glendon Schubert, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959).
58 Ibid., 175.
59 j
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
having demonstrated that approaches based on the assumption of rationality could be applied 
to “important political problems,” including Supreme Court decision-making.60
Over the past three decades, a number of variations of the strategic approach have 
been developed which are based on the insights of Schubert’s early game theory research.61 
The cooperative model is a variation of the strategic paradigm often associated with the work 
of Walter Murphy, which focuses on the dynamics of decision-making in a small group 
context. It theorizes that, “justices support stare decisis not because they normatively feel 
that they ought to, but because the long-term survival of their policy goals depends on it."62 
Judges at the appellate level seeking to establish or uphold a legal rule that reflects their 
preferred policy position need the support of other judges. Consequently, they might alter 
their preference to accommodate the preferences of other judges on the court.63 Appeals to 
pre-existing norms, such as precedent, can be an effective strategy for consensus building.
Scholars using strategic-choice models have theoretically demonstrated that, under 
certain conditions, judges may cooperate and respect precedents to ensure the survival of 
their policy goals.64 To illustrate how cooperative behaviour among policy-motivated judges 
could produce respect for precedent, consider the hypothetical case used by Spaeth and 
Segal, which involves two judges, called A and B. Suppose that a decision to overrule a 
precedent involves some loss in institutional prestige, and that the judges are risk averse.65
60 Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, “Walter F. Murphy: The Interactive Nature of Judicial Decision Making,” 
in Nancy Maveety, ed., The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior (Ann Arbor; University of Michigan Press, 
2003), 203. Although this chapter is primarily about the work of Walter Murphy, it also discusses 
Schubert’s contributions to the field of judicial behavioral studies.
61 For examples of these variations, see Jeffrey Segal, “Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory 
of Congress and Courts,” American Political Science Review 91 (1997): 28 -  44; Rafael Gely and Pablo 
Spiller, “A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Decision Making with Applications to the State 
Farm and Grove City Cases,” Journal of Law. Economics. & Organization 6 (1990): 263 -  300.
62 See Spaeth and Segal, Minority Rule, 13; Walter Murphy, James Fleming and William Harris II, 
American Constitutional Interpretation (New York: Foundation Press, 1986).
63 Spaeth and Sega1, Minority Rule. 13.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., 14, citing Tversky and Kahneman, 453.
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Under these conditions, A and B prefer to uphold a decision they agree with to overruling a 
precedent with which they disagree.66
Alternatively, if the situation involved two precedents that will be overruled unless 
the judges cooperate, one favoured by judge A and the other by judge B, the model expects 
the judges to preserve the status quo, thereby upholding each other’s precedents. Thus, 
although judges may be motivated by their own preferences as to what the law should be, 
strategic scholars contend that the need for consensus building will cause them to modify 
their decisions in the direction of “rules established by existing precedent.”67
The notion that group dynamics influence the behaviour of judges on appellate 
tribunals draws heavily on the work of social psychologists examining conformity, deviance, 
and leadership. Some strategic scholars have applied this research to study the process of 
collegial influence.68 Specifically, these researchers focus on the post-hearing conferences, 
the formation of opinion coalitions, and the role of the chief justice. They use memos and 
conference notes to gain insight into how judges make decisions and gain the support of other 
judges.69 According to Nancy Maveety, this group of strategic scholars, beginning with 
Schubert and Murphy, “added the importance of small-group, leadership, and interdependent 
decision-making factors in the explanation of judicial choice.”70
The Justices on the Supreme Courts of Canada and the U.S. follow a similar process 
in forming their judgments. Justice Wilson’s description of the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
opinion formation process consists of four principal steps.71 The first step is the judges’
66 Ibid.
67 Jack Knight and Lee Epstein, “The Norm of Stare Decisis,” American Journal of Political Science 40 
(1996): 1032.
68 Maveety, 29.
69 Robert Sharpe and Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2003), ix -  xiv.
70 Maveety, 193.
71 Bertha Wilson, “Decision-Making in the Supreme Court,” University of Toronto 1 -aw Journal 36 (1986): 
236.
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conference after every hearing, during which the judges express their tentative views on the 
case in reverse order of seniority, and decide who will draft the opinion or opinions.72 The 
conference will usually reveal “whether there is any prospect of unanimity or whether there is 
clearly going to be more than one judgment.”73
During the 1960s, Cartwright C.J. introduced the judges’ case conference in an effort 
to reduce the number of multiple opinions issued by the Court. In addition to reducing the 
frequency of multiple opinions, former Justice L’Heureux-Dube has stated that the case 
conference played a “key role... in improving relations among the judges.”74 Perhaps more 
importantly, the requirement of face-to-face interaction during the case conferences provides 
judges with an opportunity to influence their colleagues.
The second stage involves the drafting of opinions and circulating them to the other 
judges. A judge will normally volunteer to author the first draft of the majority judgement or 
the Chief Justice will ask someone from the majority to do so.75 The draft is then circulated to 
the other justices at which point they “decide whether or not they are going to be able to 
concur.”76 Stage three is when members of the panel exchange comments and suggest 
amendments to the draft, which the author is free to accept or reject. In an interview with the 
Globe and Mail, former Supreme Court Justice Peter Cory explained that when authoring 
majority opinions, it is common to receive memos from other justices which read, “I agree to 
A and to B, but not to C -  and over my dead body to D.”77 If a judge is unable to accept the 
draft reasons for judgment, he or she may propose a dissent, or author a concurring opinion.
At stage four, the judges have read all of the opinions and must decide which one to join.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.




77 Kirk Makin, “Top-court judge defends bench,” The Globe and Mail. 3 March 1999, A5.
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It is clear from Justice Wilson’s description and Justice Coiy’s comments that 
Supreme Court opinions reflect the need to accommodate the views of other justices through 
bargaining and compromise. Throughout the four stages, judges act strategically to influence 
the outcome of the case and the legal principles articulated therein. Based on their 
examination of the opinion formation process on the U.S. Supreme Court, Wahlbeck,
Spriggs, and Maltzman concluded that, “the wording and scope of final majority opinions” 
reflects to a large extent the level of accommodation among the judges.78
The level of compromise on a court is affected by a number of factors, including the 
ability of the Chief Justice to “broker whatever compromises are necessary to produce a 
unanimous judgement,” or at least to reduce the number of concurring and dissenting 
opinions.79 In fact, chief justices are often evaluated based on their ability to generate clear, 
unanimous judgments in important cases.80 More importantly, strategic scholars argue that 
the dynamics of face-to-face interaction and peer influence affect the extent to which a court 
adheres to its own previous decisions.
Another variation of the strategic account maintains that judges follow stare decisis 
as a matter of institutional legitimacy. Commentators such as former U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice Lewis Powell Jr. argue that respect for precedent enhances the legitimacy of court 
rulings.81 Under this view, adherence to precedent contributes to the perception that 
judgments are based on law and not on arbitrarily imposed preferences, which is essential to 
maintaining the legitimacy of the judiciary. Canon and Johnson explain that a court decision
78 Paul Wahlbeck, James Spriggs, and Forrest Maltzman, “Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and 
Accommodation on the United States Supreme Court,” American Journal of Political Science 42 (1998): 
313.
79 Maclvor, 101.
80 For example, see Peter McCormick, “Follow the Leader: Judicial Power and Judicial Leadership on the 
Laskin Court, 1973 -  1984,” Queen’s Law Journal 24 (1998): 237 -  277. McCormick concludes at pg. 265 
that although Laskin was a frequent dissenter initially, he exercised “strong and decisive leadership over his 
court” in the last four terms.
81 Lewis F. Powell Jr., “Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint,” Washington and Lee Law Review 47, no. 2 
(1990): 286.
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is legitimate because the public “concedes that the institution’s proper function in society to 
make such a decision and that the decision itself is not grossly biased or totally absurd.”82 
Hence, legitimacy does not require the public to accept or agree with a particular court 
decision.
Similarly, Knight and Epstein have argued that, in justifying their rulings, judges 
must “choose from among a set of rules that the members of that society will recognize and 
accept.”83 There are a number of “acceptable rules” which judges can use to explain their 
decisions, including statutory texts, canons of construction, and precedent. Consequently, 
judges use precedent to justify their decisions because stare decisisis is regarded as an 
“acceptable rule” by the general public and legal community. Therefore, concern for the 
court’s legitimacy may lead judges to abide by precedents, including those that conflict with 
their personal preferences.
Other commentators suggest that judges may abide by precedent to ensure the 
implementation of their decisions. Enforcing judicial decisions often requires the cooperation 
of other government actors, including Parliament, provincial legislatures, government 
departments or agencies, police, and lower courts.84 As McGuire and Stimson have noted, 
“while the Court is certainly not eleetorally accountable, those responsible for putting its 
rulings into effect frequently are.”85 According to this argument, government officials 
seeking to be re-elected may refuse to implement unpopular judicial decisions, or those seen 
as illegitimate. For example, politicians and judges in some southern U.S. states refused to
82 Bradley Canon and Charles Johnson, Judicial Policies: Implementation and Impact (Washington D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1999), 156.
83 Knight and Epstein, 1021; see also, Jeffery J. Mondak, “Policy Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: The 
Sources and Contexts of Legitimation,” Political Research Quarterly 47, no. 3 (1994): 675-692.
84 Canon and Johnson, 26.
85 Kevin A. McGuire and James Stimson, “The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on 
Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences,” Journal of Politics 66, no. 4 (2004): 1019.
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enforce the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board o f Education, which ordered the 
desegregation of public schools across the country.86
Murphy hypothesized that the need to ensure the implementation of their decisions 
may induce judges to follow precedents, or at least discourage them from overruling previous 
decisions. He argued that a court which frequently overruled or refused to adhere to its own 
decisions, “could not expect others to respect [those] decisions.”87 For these reasons, strategic 
scholars maintain that judges will abide by precedents to enhance the legitimacy of their 
rulings, thereby increasing the chance that they will be implemented properly.
Professional reputation is another reason offered by strategic scholars as to why 
judges follow precedent.88 In particular, the desire to have a reputation as a consistent, 
principled jurist may produce adherence to what Reed Lawler described as a policy of 
“personal stare decisis”*9 The traditional theory of stare decisis espoused by proponents of 
the legal model posits that the outcome of a case is independent of the deciding judge. It is 
therefore “impersonal.” In contrast, “personal stare decisis” recognizes that while “judges are 
often inconsistent with each other... each judge is consistent unto himself....”90 To maintain 
their own personal consistency, judges attempt to “show the logical link between the 
immediate decision and his or her past decisions.”91 It follows that more experienced judges 
will have a longer trail of past decisions to wh ich they must conform.
In their previously discussed study of the influence of precedent in cases which 
altered precedent, Brenner and Spaeth also tested the influence of “personal stare decisis” on 
the votes of the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court. Rather than conforming to the court’s
86 Maclvor, 126.
87 Murphy, Fleming, and Harris, 308.
88 See Schauer, “Incentives,” 618.
89 Reed Lawlor, “Personal Stare Decisis.” Southern California Law Review 73 (1968). 73.
90 Ibid., 81.
91 McCormick, Peter. “The Supreme Court Cites the Supreme Court: Follow-Up Citation on the Supreme 
Court of Canada, 1989 -  1993.” Oseoode Hall Law Journal 33, no. 3 (1995). 461.
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established precedents, “personal stare decisis” occurs when a judge votes consistently with 
his or her previous decisions.92 For instance, if a judge dissents from the majority in a 
precedent-setting case, and dissents in a subsequent case that relied on the majority opinion 
from the original precedent, the judges’ behaviour conforms to “personal stare decisis.” 
Brenner and Spaeth found that a majority of judges in their dataset demonstrated 
strong support for “personal stare decisis,” which may indicate that reputation is an important 
consideration. Specifically, all of the Justices included in their sample “manifested more 
support for personal stare decisis than for the legal model.”93 Thus, professional reputation is 
another reason advanced by supporters of the strategic model to explain why judges abide by 
precedents. It should be noted that although it is an eclectic model with numerous variations, 
compared to the legal and attitudinal models, the strategic approach provides perhaps the 
most accurate description of the judicial decision-making process.
3. The Attitudinal Model
In contrast to both the legal and moderate models, the attitudinal model posits that 
legal factors have virtually no impact on the decisions of Supreme Court Justices. According 
to the attitudinal model, the “facts of a case vis-a-vis the ideological values, attitudes, and 
preferences of individual justices provide the single best explanation for their votes.”94 The 
attitudinal approach to judicial behaviour rests on the theoretical insights of social 
psychology, the legal realism movement, and neo-institutionalism. However, testing the 
assumptions of the attitudinal model was not possible until the rise of behaviouralism in the 
social sciences following WWII and the corresponding development of new empirical 
methodologies.
92 Brenner and Spaeth. Stare Indecisis. 73.
93 Ibid., 85.
94 Segal, 33.
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The legal realism movement, which emerged at the turn of the 20th century, 
challenged many of the basic assumptions on which the legal model rested. Early realists 
attempted to inject the “spirit of scientific investigation” into the study of law. For this 
reason, the legal realism movement has been described as the “first significant and visible 
intersection between applied social science and legal scholarship.”95 As Spaeth and Segal 
explain, the legal realists argued that the “reigning orthodoxy, [Blackstone’s] mechanical 
jurisprudence, poorly described what judges actually did.”96
This sentiment is evident in the works of the venerable American jurist Oliver W. 
Holmes, who is regarded by many as the father of legal realism. In his influential article,
“The Path of the Law,” Holmes stated, “The danger of which I speak is not the admission 
that the principles governing other phenomena also govern the law, but the notion that a 
given [legal] system... can be worked out like mathematics... ”97 In Holmes’s view, “the life 
of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”98 Legal realists view law as an 
institution constantly in flux, and not as a set of stable propositions capable of being neutrally 
applied on a case-by-case basis.
The concern of realists is with what legal actors actually do, rather than what they 
say. Consequently, realists argue that judicial opinions citing precedent are merely post hoc 
rationalizations, not the cause of the decision itself.99 For realists, judicial opinions reveal 
only the “superficial and announced determinants of judicial decisions,” not the “real
95 Michael Heise, “The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making 
and the New Empiricism,” University of Illinois Law Review 2002 (2002): 822.
96 Spaeth and Segal, Majority Rule. 16.
97 Oliver W. Holmes, “The Path of the Law,” Harvard Law Review 10, no. 8 (1897): 465. [hereinafter 
Holmes, The Path of the Law,”]
98 Oliver W. Holmes, The Common Law (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1963), 5.
99 See generally, Karl N. Llewellyn, “Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or 
Canons about how Statutes are to be Construed,” Vanderbilt Law Review 3, no. 1 (1950): 395-406.
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determinants” of those decisions.100 Proponents of realism complained that legal scholarship 
was overly concerned with studying the “announced determinants” of judicial decisions.
This is reflected by the two main forms of legal research — theoretical and doctrinal 
— which Professor Schuck explains are representative of “almost the entire corpus of legal 
scholarship.”101 In order to uncover the “real determinants” of judicial behaviour, legal 
realists advocated the use of empirical methodologies to study the work of judges. Realists 
maintain that the failure to develop a tradition of empirical legal scholarship accounts for 
why so little is known of the “real determinants” of judicial behaviour.
Realists also challenge the notion that precedent “binds” future decision-makers, 
pointing out that judges can always find some aspect of the future case on which to 
“distinguish” it from the earlier one.102 Moreover, they argue that precedent is a superfluous 
doctrine, given that in any legal dispute, there are usually precedents capable of supporting 
both sides.103 Noted realist Max Radin described the rule of precedent as “an instrument 
capable of a great many variations and allowing movement in ways that have little obvious 
relation to the direction indicated in the precedent.”104
In a similar vein, Holmes maintained that many of the components of the legal 
model, such as statutory language and precedent, could be used by judges to give almost “any 
conclusion a logical form.”105 Therefore, rather than a constraint, realists see precedent as 
concealing the considerable discretion exercised by judges in deciding cases. The modem 
attitudinal model has been heavily informed by the realist belief that legal rules, such as 
precedent, do not accurately explain judicial decisions.
100 Schauer, “Incentives,” 619.
101 Peter Schuck, “Why Don’t Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?” Journal of Legal Education 
39 (1989): 329.
102 David M. Adams, Philosophical Problems in the Law. 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Wadsworth, 2000), 77.
103 Ibid.
104 Max Radin, “Case Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning Prajudizienrecht in Amerika,” Columbia Law 
Review 33 (1933), 203.
105 Holmes, “The Path of the Law,” 466.
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The attitudinal model has also been influenced by neo-institutionalist theories, which 
focus on how decision-making environments are shaped by institutional rules and structures. 
Specifically, the attitudinal model accepts the neo-institutionalist position that the degree of 
discretion exercised by judges is a function of their institutional environment.106 According to 
attitudinalists, Supreme Court justices are able to vote based on their personal values and 
preferences because they are not politically accountable, enjoy lifetime tenure, and control 
their own agenda.107
Although these factors were initially developed to describe the environment of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, similar institutional rules make it possible to apply them to the Supreme 
Court of Canada. Under the terms of the Supreme Court Act, the Court is composed of a 
Chief Justice and eight puisne judges who are appointed by the Prime Minister and serve 
until the age of seventy-five. The Justices cannot be removed unless their conduct deviates 
from the statutory standard of “good behaviour.”108 To be eligible to serve on the Court, an 
individual must have been a provincial superior court judge or an attorney with at least ten 
years’ standing at the bar of a province. Furthermore, the Act prohibits j ustices from holding 
any other political office. Finally, with a few exceptions, the Supreme Court of Canada 
controls its own agenda. In sum, the institutional rules and structures governing the judicial 
system make it possible for the Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada to decide cases 
according to their ideological values and attitudes if they so choose.
Each of the approaches to judicial decision-making that have been discussed requires 
researchers to identify the preferences of individual judges. Because the attitudinal model 
expects judges to decide cases based on personal preferences, analysts must determine what
106 Segal, 29.
107 Spaeth and Segal, Majority Rule. 18-19.
108 See Department of Justice Canada, Supreme Court Act. R.S. 1985, c. S-26, online, available from 
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/S-26/text.html.
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those preferences are before they can test whether they have any influence. The first scholar 
to comprehensively test the attitudinal model, political scientist Gendon Schubert, developed 
a method for determining judicial preferences by ordering the characteristics of a given case 
and the judicial decision based on them along ideological dimensions.109 Schubert employed 
scalogram analysis, also called cumulative scaling or Guttman scaling, which is a technique 
used by psychologists to measure attitudes toward certain stimuli. An attitude is defined as an 
“enduring syndrome of response consistency with regard to a set of social objects.”110 The 
aim of cumulative scaling is to determine whether responses to stimuli are the result of a 
single dominant attitudinal variable.
In order to illustrate Schubert’s application of cumulative scaling to judicial 
behaviour, consider two police searches which involved nearly identical facts and uncovered 
equally incriminating evidence. For this hypothetical scale, the attitudinal variable under 
investigation is the justices’ attitudes toward search and seizure cases. Suppose, further, that 
the police obtained a warrant for the first search but did not for the second.111 According to 
Schubert, the first search is more protective of individual liberty than the second because a 
warrant was obtained. For this reason, case 1 is considered “liberal” and should be placed to 
the left of case 2 on the line representing ideological space.112 The justices who decide these 
cases can also be placed along the ideological space. Due to their position in Figure 2. A, 
justice A may be described as a liberal, B as a moderate, and C as a conservative.
109 Brenner and Spaeth, Stare Indecisis. 59.
110 S. R. Peck, “The Supreme Court of Canada, 1958 — 1966: A Search for Policy through Scalogram 
Analysis,” The Canadian Bar Review 45 (1967): 668.
111 This example is based on the ones used by Brenner and Spaeth, Stare Indecisis. 59-60; and Segal, 29.
112 Brenner and Spaeth, Stare Indecisis. 60.
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Figure 2.A
Hypothetical cases and judges in ideological space
^  * 1 * 1---------
Justice A Justice B Justice C
Case 1 Case 2
Figure reprinted from: Saul Brenner and Harold Spaeth, Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of Precedent on the 
Supreme Court. 1946-1992 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 60.
Schubert hypothesized that a judge “will vote to uphold any search to the left of his 
point in the space and void any search to his right.”113 Judge A will therefore vote in favour 
of the defendants in each case (and void the searches), while judge C will uphold the legality 
of both searches. However, if justice A voted against the defendant in case 2, that response is 
considered inconsistent and may be the result of an attitude other than the one under 
investigation.
Scales produce a measure called the “coefficient of reproducibility,” the size of which 
indicates the degree that an actual response pattern corresponds to that of a perfect scale.114 A 
coefficient of reproducibility of .90 suggests “unidimensionality” in a scale, meaning that the 
responses are likely the result of the hypothesized attitude.115 Suppose that in the above 
example justice A participated in a series of search and seizure cases, and voted consistently 
in favour of the “liberal” (defined as pro-defendant) position. If justice A’s scaled votes in 
these cases produced a coefficient of reproducibility of .90, it would be reasonable to 
conclude that justice A voted according to his or her attitude toward search and seizure cases.
Canadian scholars have used scalogram analysis to study the work of the Supreme 
Court since the mid-1960s. For example, in 1967 S. R. Peck examined the decisions of the
113 Ibid.
114 Schubert, 271.
115 Ibid. See, Earl Babbie and Lucia Benaquisto, Fundamentals of Social Research (Scarborough: Thomson 
Canada Ltd., 2002): 155-156.
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Supreme Court from 1958 to 1966 in the areas of taxation, negligence, and criminal law.
Peck’s taxation scale produced a coefficient of reproducibility of .93, which indicates that the 
“justices reach their decisions on the basis of their attitudes to taxation.”116 Moreover, when 
the justices’ votes in taxation cases are dichotomously classified as either “pro-taxpayer” or 
“pro-government,” the scale demonstrated that Justice Cartwright consistently took a “pro­
taxpayer” position, whereas Justices Abbott and Fauteux were the most “pro-government.”117 
In his contribution to Schubert and Danelski’s 1969 publication, Comparative 
Judicial Behavior. Donald Fouts constructed scalograms to assess the decisions of the 
Supreme Court from 1950 to 1960 in cases involving civil liberties, economic regulation, 
taxation, and labour-management relations. Fouts concluded that during the 1950s, the 
Supreme Court was generally “pro-economic liberalism” and slightly “anti-civil liberties.”118 
Perhaps more significantly, Fouts’s data confirmed what many political scientists suspected, 
which is that the four Justices from Quebec (Taschereau, Fauteux, Rinffet, and Abbott) 
consistently voted together as a block in economic and civil liberties cases.119
The validity of Schubert’s model and the other early cumulative scaling techniques 
used to identify judicial attitudes has been subject to considerable criticism.120 Because 
judges, unlike other political actors, are not disposed to reveal their values and attitudes, 
researchers must rely on their votes as “surrogates for those beliefs.”121 The problem, as 
Segal explains, is that “the measures for the independent and dependent variables are 
identical.” In other words, early versions of the attitudinal model were flawed because they
116 Peck, 684.
117 Ibid., 688.
118 Donald Fouts, “Policy-Making in the Supreme Court of Canada, 1950-1960,” in Glendon Schubert and 
David Danelski (eds.) Comparative Judicial Behavior: Cross-Cultural Studies of Political Decision-Making
in the East and West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 283.
120 For a detailed discussion of these early methods see, Joseph Tanenhaus, “The Cumulative Scaling of 
Judicial Decisions,” Harvard Law Review 79, no. 4 (1966): 1583-1594.
12! Lee Epstein and Carol Mershon, “Measuring Political Preferences,” American Journal of Political 
Science 40, no. 1 (1996): 263.
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employed circular reasoning.122 As Brenner and Spaeth note, “one cannot scientifically 
demonstrate that attitudes influence the votes when the attitudes are operationalized from 
these same votes.”123
To overcome the circularity problem, attitudinal researchers developed measures for 
judicial preferences that are independent of the votes they cast. A number of scholars use the 
past votes of judges to align them on an ideological scale similar to that developed by 
Schubert. Others argue that this approach falls short because attitudes are still being 
operationalized from the justices’ votes.124 Nevertheless, researchers have demonstrated that 
past votes are “excellent predictors” of future behaviour in certain types of legal disputes.125 
As a truly independent measure of ideology, content analysis of materials produced by, or 
about, a particular judge, including published works, speeches, and newspaper editorials, has 
proven effective.126 Relying on this methodology, Segal and Cover found a robust correlation 
of .80 between their measure of attitudes and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in civil 
liberties cases.127
Considerable research has been undertaken in recent years on the decision-making 
patterns of individual Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada. Although most of this 
research is not explicitly designed to test the attitudinal model, some studies have found 
evidence in support of its fundamental propositions. In particular, the work of F.L. Morton 
and others has focused on the Justices’ attitudes toward different Charter rights and classes of 
Charter litigants. They constructed two indices: a “legal rights” index which included only 
cases implicating sections 7-14 of the Charter or which involved some other section but
122 Ibid.
123 Brenner and Spaeth, Stare Indecisis. 63.
124 Epstein and Mershon, 264.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Jeffrey A. Segal and Albert Cover, “Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices,” 
American Political Science Review 83, no. 2 (1989): 562.
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pertain to a criminal law issue; and a “Court Party” index.128 Morton, Russell and Riddell 
used the “Court Party” index to measure the Judges’ support for “Court Party” issues and/or 
groups. An index, which is similar to a scale, simply involves accumulating scores that are 
assigned to individual attributes.129 Thus, the legal rights index is constructed by tabulating 
how often each justice votes in favour of or against a claim involving legal rights.
Using the Justices’ past votes from all applicable Charter cases decided from 1982 to 
1992, Morton and others found that the voting behaviour of certain members of the Court 
varies considerably from one index to the other. Former Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s decisions 
illustrate this point well: she was found to have the second lowest rate of support for Charter 
claimants in criminal law cases, and the second highest support rate for the “Court Party.”130 
In terms of her ideological position relative to the other Justices, L’Heureux-Dube J. would 
be placed on the “left wing” of the Court for the “Court Party” cases, and on the “right wing” 
for criminal rights cases.131
In another study designed to test the attitudinal model, the researchers concluded that 
Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s opinions reflect a “communitarian orientation” which emphasizes 
two broad themes: “(1)... the protection of society from criminal offenders; and (2)... an ethic 
of care for groups facing discriminatory treatment or harm.”132 They also determined that 
from 1991 to 1995, the Court was dominated by three attitudinal conflicts: communitarianism 
versus libertarianism; the due process rights of criminals versus the need to protect society;
128 F.L. Morton, P.H. Russell and T. Riddell, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A 
Descriptive Analysis of the First Decade, 1982-1992,” National Journal of Constitutional Law 5, no, 1 
(1994): 45. The concept of the “Court Party” was developed by Morton and Knopff to describe a “coalition 
of minoritarian/ post-materialist interests,” that pursue their policy agendas through Charter litigation.
129 Babbie and Benaquisto, 136.
130 Morton et al, 46. For similar findings, see also, James B. Kelly, “The Charter of Rights and the 
Rebalancing of Liberal Constitutionalism in Canada, 1982-1997,” Osgood Hall Law Journal 37, no. 3 
(1999): 680.
131 Morton et al, 47.
132 C.L. Ostberg and Matthew Wetstein, “Attitudinal Dimensions of Supreme Court Decision Making in 
Canada: The Lamer Court, 1991 -  1995,” Political Research Quarterly 55 (2002): 244.
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and judicial activism versus judicial restraint.133 Taken together, these studies suggest that the 
Justices hold various attitudes towards Charter rights. As Andrew Heard argued in 1991, a 
consequence of these divergent judicial attitudes, combined with the use of five- and seven- 
judge panels, is that the outcome of Charter cases depends in large part on which Justices 
hear the appeal.134 However, the use of such panels is much less common today than it was 
ten years ago.
Other researchers have examined the connection between the personal attributes of 
judges and their voting behaviour. Personal attribute approaches use the background and 
demographic characteristics of individual judges to explain past voting behaviour, and to 
predict how they will vote in future cases.135 It should be noted that although personal 
attribute approaches are considered distinct from the attitudinal model, they share the 
assumption that personal attitudes account for judicial behaviour. Background characteristics 
are not seen as the cause of judicial decisions, but rather as useful to explaining the formation 
of particular attitudes. Variables including gender, race, religion, and education (prestige of 
schools) have, in some instances, proven to be highly effective at predicting future 
behaviour.136
For example, the personal attribute models developed by Neal Tate were able to 
account for a considerable 70 to 90 percent of the variance in the voting behaviour of postwar 
U.S. Supreme Court justices in decisions concerning civil rights and liberties, and 
economics.137 In 1989, Tate and Sittiwong applied the personal attribute model to the 
members of the Supreme Court of Canada who sat between 1949 and 1985. They found
133 Ibid.
534 See generally, Andrew Heard, “The Charter in the Supreme Court of Canada: The Importance of Which 
Judges Hear an Appeal,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 24, no. 2 (1991): 289-307.
135 Epstein and Knight, 206.
536 See Heise, 834 at note 73.
137 Neal Tate, “Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: 
Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1956-1978,” American Political Science Review 
75, no. 2 (1981): 355-367.
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strong indications that religion, region of origin (especially Quebec/non-Quebec), appointing 
prime minister, political affiliation, and length of judicial experience were correlated to the 
judge’s voting behaviour in civil rights and liberties and economic cases.138 Other research 
has highlighted the distinctive voting behaviour of female Supreme Court Justices in certain 
types of cases.139 Most importantly, researchers using attitudinal and personal attribute 
models have empirically demonstrated the salience of non-legai factors in the judicial 
decision-making process.
In summary, Canadian and American research has convincingly established that 
personal attitudes, preferences, and attributes are useful in both predicting and explaining the 
voting behaviour of Supreme Court Justices. Notwithstanding problems related to the 
empirical tests and measures, Segal explains that, “even critics of the attitudinal model have 
conceded its exceptional explanatory ability.”140 Alternatively, the few studies that have 
quantitatively examined the propositions of the legal model, have found at best limited 
evidence to support the conventional wisdom that precedent influences judicial decision­
making. While content analyses have found that judges frequently cite and appeal to 
precedent in their opinions, justifying decisions with previous cases is not the same as being 
influenced by them.
Notably absent from the existing literature is research examining factors associated 
with the legal model, and the influence they may have on the Justices of the Canadian 
Supreme Court. The proposed study will attempt to fill the void in the existing body of 
literature by comprehensively examining whether precedent (a component of the legal 
model) has any influence on the decisions of the Supreme Court Justices. Specifically, the
138 Neal Tate and Panu Sittiwong, “Decision Making in the Canadian Supreme Court: Extending the 
Personal Attributes Model across Nations,” Journal of Politics 51, no. 4 (1989): 900-916.
139 See Peter McCormick, “Alliances and Influences on the Lamer Court, 1990 -  1997,” OsgoodeH all Law 
Journal 36 (1998): 359.
140 Segal, 33.
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research will be undertaken in three stages: a content analysis of the Court’s written opinions; 
application of the methodology used by Brenner and Spaeth to test the influence of precedent 
in cases which alter precedent; and application of Segal and Spaeth’s methodology for 
measuring precedential influence.
4. Hypotheses
Based on the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence and the findings of previous 
research, the study hypothesizes:
1. Supreme Court Justices will invoke arguments based on precedent more 
than arguments from other sources in their written opinions.
2a. The majority of Supreme Court Justices will exhibit low levels of support for 
“institutional” stare decisis (33 percent or less), and moderate to high levels of 
support for “personal” stare decisis (34 percent and above).
2b. The Court as a whole will exhibit a low level of support for “institutional” stare 
decisis (33 percent or less), and moderate to high levels of support for “personal” 
stare decisis (34 percent and above).
3 a. The majority of Supreme Court Justices will exhibit weak levels of “precedential 
behaviour” (33 percent or less), and strong levels of “preferential behaviour” (68 
percent and above).
3b. The Court as a whole will exhibit a weak level of “precedential behaviour” (33 
percent or less), and a strong level of “preferential behaviour” (68 percent and 
above).141
141 The cut-off points are the same as used in Segal and Spaeth. Majority Rule. 2 1 -2 2 .





The first hypothesis is that file Court will frequently invoke arguments from 
precedent in its opinions, relative to arguments from other sources. To test this expectation, a 
content analysis will be conducted of the Court’s published opinions from the 2004 term.1 
Similar to the approach used by Phelps and Gates, each paragraph of an opinion will be a 
separate unit of observation.2 The name of the Justice who wrote each opinion will be 
recorded, as well as whether the opinion was written for the majority, concurring with the 
majority, or dissenting.
Each paragraph from those opinions is then assigned to one of nine straightforward 
categories, seven of which represent a different “mode of argument.”3 In justifying their 
decisions, judges employ various “modes of argument” such as precedent and scholarly 
materials. Presumably, each paragraph will contain one “mode of argument.” Paragraphs will 
be classified according to whether the argument is based on: statutory/constitutional text, 
legislative materials, precedent, scholarly materials, intervener submissions, social science 
evidence, or “higher law” sources. Note that the first three “modes” are aspects of the legal 
model, while some of the remaining categories comport with the features of the attitudinal 
model. Thus, it is also possible to combine the variables associated with the legal model and 
calculate the frequency of arguments based on legal rules.
1 The cases will be obtained from the Supreme Court’s online database at, http://lexum.umontreal.ca/csc- 
scc/en.html.
2 Glenn A. Phelps and John G. Gates, “The Myth of Jurisprudence: Interpretive Theory in the 
Constitutional Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan,” Santa Clara Law Review 31, no. 2 (1991): 
586. As the authors explain, based on the conventions of English usage, a paragraph “should be 
thematically unified and express one central idea.” As such, each paragraph should contain only one 
primary “mode of argument.”
3 Ibid., 587.
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Textual arguments are those based on the specific language of an international treaty, 
or constitutional/statutory provision. References to the Interpretation Act, which provides 
guidance to the courts regarding the interpretation of statutes, are classified as textual 
arguments.4 The category also includes references to dictionaries since they are used to assist 
in determining the meaning of a text.
Arguments based on legislative materials are those which rely on statements made by 
legislators during debates, and committee reports. They are usually used by the Court to 
ascertain the purpose or intent of a constitutional/statutory provision. Although the Supreme 
Court has warned that such materials should be given “minimal weight” in the context of 
Charter interpretation, the Court continues to consult legislative materials in its statutory 
jurisprudence and occasionally in Charter cases.5
Arguments based on precedent include any instance in which the Court uses case law: 
its own decisions, those of federal and provincial courts, and/or the decisions of foreign 
courts. However, the precedent category does not include paragraphs discussing the judicial 
history of the particular case that the Supreme Court is considering.
A category has been created for arguments based on scholarly materials such as 
textbooks and periodicals. Until relatively recently, the Supreme Court followed a policy 
which discouraged referencing living authors.6 However, today scholarly materials are 
regularly used by the Justices to support their decisions.
Conversely, “higher law” arguments invoke principles that, while not necessarily 
derived from textual sources, are considered implicit in the structure or history of the 
Canadian legal system. Moreover, appealing to the concept of “natural justice,” or natural
4 Canadian Legal Information Institute, Interpretation Act. R.S. 1985, c. 1-23, s. 1, online, available from 
http.//www. canlii. org/ca/sta/i-21.
5 Ref. Re. s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, par. 52.
6 Peter McCormick, “The Judges and the Journals: Citation of Periodical Literature by the Supreme Court 
of Canada, 1985 -  2004,” The Canadian Bar Review 83 (2004): 636.
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law, is an example of an argument based on a “higher law” source.7 An excellent example of 
the use of “higher law” sources occurred in Re Secession o f Quebec, where the Court’s 
decision-making was guided by certain “underlying constitutional principles: federalism, 
democracy, constitutionalism, the rule of law, and respect for minority rights.”8 Finally, the 
use of constitutional values to justify a non-constitutional decision is considered a “higher 
law” source.
An additional category has been included to classify paragraphs that discuss the facts 
of a case and its litigation history.9 It also includes paragraphs that simply state the questions 
raised by the appeal. A category was also created for paragraphs that do not fit into one of the 
other modes of argument. Furthermore, because most cases raise more than one issue, the 
analysis will indicate whether the “object” of the mode of argument within each paragraph is 
constitutional, statutory, or other.
Based on the results of the content analysis, it will be possible to identify the mode of 
argument which the Justices employ most frequently in their opinions. Moreover, the data 
will be examined to determine whether any relationships can be detected between judges and 
“modes of argument,” and between “mode of argument” and case type. The results are 
expected to show that the Court employs arguments from precedent with greater frequency 
than any other source.
2.1 The Characteristics of Precedent Altering Decisions
The second stage of the research examines the influence of precedent on the votes of 
the Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada in cases which alter precedent. It will be 
divided into two parts , the first describes the characteristics of precedents altered by the
7 For a discussion of “higher law” sources see, Charles Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter? The Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,” American Political Science Review 90, no. 4 (1996): 773.
8 Ref. Re. Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, par. 49.
9 Phelps and Gates, 578.
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Supreme Court since 1950; the second part assesses the influence of precedent on the votes 
of the Justices in cases that alter precedent. The choice to use cases which “alter” rather than 
“overrule” precedent was made to ensure an adequate sample size. As noted earlier, the 
Supreme Court rarely issues decisions that explicitly overrule a precedent. Consequently, 
using only cases that formally overrule a precedent would severely limit the number of cases 
included in the sample.
Part one requires compiling a list of cases in which the Court has altered its own 
precedents or those established by the JCPC or House of Lords. Although the Court 
frequently “alters” the direction of the law in a particular area, this study is concerned only 
with cases which substantially alter a principle or rule of law articulated in a previous 
decision. Identification of precedent-altering decisions relies primarily on a statement in the 
Court’s majority or plurality opinion that the decision alters one or more precedents.10 This 
should reduce the subjectivity involved in determining what constitutes a precedent-altering 
decision.
There are a number of ways that the Court can alter precedent. The clearest example 
of altering precedent occurs when the Court overrules a prior decision. In some cases the 
Court will clearly indicate that it is overruling a precedent in the section near the beginning of 
each judgment titled “cases cited.”11 However, there are examples of the Court overruling a 
precedent without acknowledging it under the “cases cited” heading.12 In some instances, the 
Court overrules a precedent but does not explicitly admit to it until a subsequent decision.
10 Saul Brenner and Harold Spaeth. Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of Precedent on the Supreme Court. 
1946 -1992  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 19. [hereinafter Brenner and Spaeth, Stare 
Indecisis!
11 For example, see Wells v. Newfoundland [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199.
12 In U.S. v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, the Court overruled its decisions in Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 
S.C.R. 779 and Ref. Re Ng, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858. However, these cases were listed under the “cases cited” 
heading as “explained” rather than “overruled.”
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Sometimes the Court will list a precedent as “not followed,” or “distinguished,” 
which alone is not enough to be classified as a precedent altering decision. To be considered 
precedent-altering, the Court must say that a precedent has not been followed or 
distinguished, accompanied by a statement to the effect of, “this decision is no longer good 
law,” or “can no longer be regarded as controlling.”13 The Court can also alter precedent by 
refusing to apply the majority judgment from an earlier decision. In addition to reading the 
Court’s decisions, scholarly materials, including textbooks and periodical literature, will be 
used to aid in the identification of precedent-altering decisions. While the list of altering and 
altered precedents does not purport to be exhaustive, it does provide a fairly comprehensive 
picture of how the members of the Supreme Court approach the doctrine of stare decisis in 
their precedent-altering judgments.
The characteristics of the altering and altered precedents are then entered into an 
SPSS database. Each decision is identified in the database by name, citation, and year as 
listed in the Supreme Court Reports or the Dominion Law Reports. For each precedent 
altering decision, the presiding Chief Justice is recorded. Specifically, they are given a value 
from one to nine, which represent all of the Chief Justices that have served since 1950. The 
values are as follows: (1) Rinffet; (2) Kerwin; (3) Taschereau; (4) Cartwright; (5) Fauteux;
(6) Laskin; (7) Dickson; (8) Lamer; (9) McLachlin.
The votes from the precedent-altering decisions are coded into one of three categories 
which represent different levels of agreement among die Justices. The “high level of 
agreement” category includes unanimous (or eight-to-one) decisions to alter precedent.14 
Justices express “moderate levels of agreement” in decisions decided by votes of: seven-to-
13 In Bell v. The Queen, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 212, the Court stated that it was “no longer bound by the decision 
in City of Toronto v. Polai, [1973] S.C.R. 38,” even though the decision was listed as “distinguished” in the 
“cases cited” section of the judgment.
14 Brenner and Spaeth, Stare Indecisis. 32.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
60
one, seven-to-two, six-to-one, six-to-two, five-to-one, and five-to-two.15 Alternatively, a low 
level of agreement occurs when the vote is five-to-four, five-to-three, six-to-three, and three- 
to-two.16 Moreover, the court that decided the altered precedent is coded as either: (1) the 
Supreme Court of Canada; or (2) English Court, which includes the JCPC, House of Lords, 
and the English Courts of Appeal. Precedents established by lower or foreign courts other 
than the “high courts” of England are omitted since the Supreme Court is not, and has never 
been, “bound” to follow them.
The Chief Justice at the time the altered precedent was decided is recorded. Although 
the list of Chief Justices for the precedent-altering decisions only includes those who have 
served since 1950, the list for the altered decisions includes every Chief Justice since the 
Court was founded in 1875. The values for Chief Justice are as follows: (1) Richards; (2) 
Ritchie; (3) Strong; (4) Taschereau; (5) Fitzpatrick; (6) Davies; (7) Anglin; (8) Duff; (9) 
Rinfret; (10) Kerwin; (11) R. Taschereau; (12) Cartwright; (13) Fauteux; (14) Laskin; (15) 
Dickson; (16) Lamer; (17) McLachlin. An additional value of 18 (“not applicable”) was 
added to account for altered English court precedents.
The altered precedents were further organized according to age. Altered precedents 
are placed into one of five age-ranges. The first category includes all decisions that are less 
than ten years old; the second includes decisions eleven to twenty years old; category three is 
for decisions between twenty-one and thirty years of age; the fourth category includes 
judgments that are thirty-one to forty years old; and the fifth category includes decisions 
forty-one years and older. Moreover, the actual age of the altered precedents is recorded.
Finally, the Court’s stated reason for altering the precedent is recorded into one of ten 
categories. Most of the categories correspond to the reasons for altering precedent identified
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 33.
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by the Supreme Court in Bernard' 1,Chaulkn, B. (K.G.)19, and Robinson20. While the Court 
frequently offers more than one justification for altering a precedent, this study is concerned 
with identifying the single most salient reason. Determining what constitutes the “most 
salient reason” involves selecting the one reason emphasized and relied on most heavily by 
the Court in justifying the alteration of precedent. In other words, the researcher must ask, 
“would the court have altered precedent in the absence of the particular reason?” If the likely 
answer is “no,” the reason may be considered the “most salient.”
The reasons for altering precedent are as follows: (1) the Court is no longer bound by 
the decisions of the JCPC; (2) the introduction of the Charter requires the Court to alter its 
jurisprudence in certain areas; (3) Parliament has enacted a law in response to a common law 
or statutory precedent; (4) a particular area of law or doctrine needs to be updated; (5) the 
altered precedent was wrongly decided; (6) the altered precedent was “unworkable” or 
created uncertainty for lower courts and others to which it applied; (7) the altered decision 
has been attenuated by subsequent Supreme Court decisions; (8) the altered decision has the 
effect of expanding criminal liability; (9) the altered decision has been the subject of 
scholarly criticism. An additional category, “(10) other,” has been included for reasons which 
do not fit into to one of the nine categories.
Based on these data, it will be possible to empirically examine and describe the 
characteristics of altering and altered Supreme Court decisions. Specifically, the data will 
reveal whether there are any patterns or trends in how the Court alters precedent. Part two of 
Section two uses the list of altering and altered decisions to test the influence of precedent on 
the Justices’ votes in cases which alter precedent. It follows a methodology similar to that
17 R. v. Bernard, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833.
18 R. v. Chaulk, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303.
19 R. v. B. (K.G.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740.
20 R. v. Robinson, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 683.
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used by Brenner and Spaeth in their examination of the influence of precedent on the U.S. 
Supreme Court in cases which overrule precedent.
2.2 The Influence of Stare Decisis in Precedent Altering Decisions
To test the influence of precedent as an aspect of the legal model, the present 
examination assumes that a vote to alter precedent conflicts with the legal model.21 Although 
some nonconformity is permissible under a “lax” version of the doctrine of precedent, 
Brenner and Spaeth explain that such deviations are “considered unusual, and defenders of 
the legal model do not present explicit guidelines about when it is appropriate to abandon 
stare decisis.”22 The units of analysis are the votes of Justices that participated in both the 
altered and altering decisions.
Furthermore, testing the influence of precedent requires distinguishing between 
“institutional” and “personal” stare decisis. The former takes place when a Justice 
“conforms” to the Court’s precedents; the latter occurs when a Justice votes consistently with 
his or her past votes. The legal model demands adherence to “institutional” stare decisis, 
whereas the strategic model expects the “personal” form to dominate. However, it should be 
noted that adherence to “personal” stare decisis may indicate that a justice is voting based on 
a set of personal attitudes toward the issues raised, which would be consistent with the 
attitudinal model. According to these criteria, four possible voting patterns may emerge:
1. A justice may vote with the majority in the altered case and dissent in the altering 
decision. This voting behaviour is consistent with both “institutional” and 
“personal” stare decisis.
2. A justice may dissent in the altered case and vote with the majority in the altering 
decision. This behaviour conforms to “personal” stare decisis while rejecting 
“institutional” stare decisis.
3. A justice may vote with the majority in the altered and altering cases. This 
behaviour conforms to neither “institutional” nor “personal” stare decisis.
21 Brenner and Spaeth, Stare Indecisis. 73.
22  t u ’ - i
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4. A justice may dissent in both the altered and altering decisions. This behaviour 
conforms to “institutional” stare decisis, but not to “personal” stare decisis 23
To determine the influence of “institutional” stare decisis on the individual justices
and the Court as a whole, I divide the total number of votes compatible with the legal model
by the number of pairs of altered and altering decisions. Each pair of decisions (i.e. the
altered and altering) which a justice participates count as one. Thus, if justice A participates
in two pairs of decisions and votes to oppose the alteration of precedent in one pair, he or she
voted compatibly with the legal model 50 percent of the time. The same formula is used to
calculate the level of support for “personal” stare decisis. Scores between 0 and 33 percent
correspond to a low level of support for either “institutional” or “personal” stare decisis.
Moderate support occurs between 34 and 67 percent, while a score of 68-100 percent
represents a high level of support.
3. The Influence of Stare Decisis in all Cases since 1950
The third stage of the research will assess whether precedent actually influences the 
decisions of the Justices on the Supreme Court. Specifically, it is hypothesized that the 
Justices will demonstrate a weak level of “precedential behaviour.” In order to test this 
prediction, Segal and Spaeth’s methodology will be applied to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Precedential influence will be measured by focusing on Justices who opposed the 
establishment of a precedent. Since their “original preferences” conflict with the precedent, 
Spaeth and Segal argue that if they subsequently support the precedent, a “strong 
assumption” can be made that the established precedent influenced their vote.24
Sampling for this type of analysis raises a number of practical issues. In compiling 
their list of precedent setting cases and “progeny,” Segal and Spaeth had the benefit of using
TI b i d -
24 Harold Spaeth and Jeffrey Segal, Majority Rule or Minority Will: Adherence to Precedent on the U.S. 
Supreme Court (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 23. [hereinafter Spaeth and Segal, 
Majority Rulel
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previously compiled data supplemented by information from legal indices. The present 
research will use the Supreme Court Reports to identify the non-unanimous precedent setting 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. However, identifying progeny —“decisions 
subsequent to the precedent whose issue(s) and factual circumstances closely resemble those 
of the precedent itself”— requires the researcher to carefully read and group the progeny 
cases with the applicable precedent.25 To aid in this process, scholarly writings, including law 
review articles and legal texts, will be consulted.
Furthermore, to ensure an adequate sample size, while also keeping the research 
manageable, this study will include only those precedent-setting cases and progeny decided 
since 1949. The selection of 1949 as the cut-off point is logical, because in that year appeals 
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council were abolished and the Supreme Court of 
Canada became the nation’s principal judicial authority.
As previously noted, this study will use Spaeth and Segal’s operational definition of 
“precedential influence,” which is “the extent to which justices who disagree with a 
precedent move toward that position in subsequent cases.”26 The dissenting vote in the 
precedent-setting case is considered the judge’s “revealed preference;” subsequent votes in 
progeny cases that are consistent with the original vote to dissent are recorded as 
“preferential.” In other words, the judge continues to vote according to his or her preferences. 
Conversely, if a judge who dissents from a precedent subsequently changes their vote in a 
progeny of that precedent, the behaviour is recorded as “precedential.”
Although vote switching by the Justices of the Supreme Court is a relatively 
uncommon occurrence, it has been known to happen. For example, during the 1987 Term, 
Justice Estey dissented in the first of a series of cases dealing with the application of section
25 Ibid., 25.
26 Ibid., 5.
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11 of the Charter, but agreed with the majority in the remaining three. In Wigglesworth, Estey 
J. dissented from the majority, arguing that section 11(h) of the Charter applied to police 
disciplinary hearings.27 However, he sided with the majority in three progeny cases which 
were explicitly based on the majority’s reasoning in Wiggle sworth.2* Thus, under Spaeth and 
Segal’s coding conventions, Justice Estey’s votes in the Wigglesworth progeny are 
considered precedential; that is, his subsequent votes conform to established precedents 
rather than his original revealed preferences.
As Spaeth and Segal note, there are different levels, or “manifestations” of 
precedential and preferential behaviour, “that might properly be considered an ordinal 
scale.”29 Specifically, they divide precedential behaviour into three exclusive categories: 
weak, moderate, and strong. “Strong precedential” behaviour occurs when a judge “formally 
accedes” to the precedent in a written opinion.30 “Moderate precedential” behaviour occurs 
when a judge joins or writes an opinion that “specifically supports and cites” the precedent as 
an authority for their vote.31 Justice Estey’s vote for the majority opinion in Trumbley, which 
explicitly cites Wigglesworth, is an excellent illustration of “moderate precedential” 
behaviour. A dissenting judge can also accede to a precedent without saying so, by voting in 
a progeny compatibly with the (ideological) direction of the decision in the precedent, which 
is defined as “weak precedential behaviour.”32
There are also varying levels of preferential behaviour, which takes place when a 
judge continues to dissent in progeny cases. “Weak preferential” behaviour occurs when a
27 See R. v. Wigglesworth, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541.
28 Burnham v. Metropolitan Toronto Police, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 572; Trumbley and Pugh v. Metropolitan 
Toronto Police, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 577; Trimm v. Durham Regional Police, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 582; see also, 
Heard, 296.
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dissenter joins or writes an opinion opposite in direction from that of the precedent.33 For 
example, a vote against a criminal rights claim is considered “conservative.” If the judge 
continues to oppose similar criminal rights claims, without referring to his or her dissent in 
the original case, the judges’ votes are consistent with “weak preferential” behaviour. 
“Moderate preferential” justices will support their original position by dissenting from, or 
concurring with the opinion in a progeny that cites the precedent as authority.34 Conversely, 
“strong preferential” judges continue to oppose the precedent, by either explicitly saying so, 
or by citing their dissent from the precedent as an authority.35
For each dissenting judge, the number of preferential and precedential votes in 
progeny cases are totalled, and assigned to one of the six aforementioned categories 
representing degrees of precedential and preferential behaviour. Dividing the votes in the 
“strong,” “moderate,” and “weak” precedential categories by the judge’s total number of 
precedential votes, produces a percentage total for each category. The same process is 
repeated for the preferential voting categories, as well as for all of the judges’ votes 
combined.
To determine the overall level of precedential support for each judge and the Court as 
a whole, Spaeth and Segal’s “cut-off points” will be used. On this scale, 0-33 percent is 
considered a weak level of precedential support, 34-67 percent is moderate, and 68-100 
percent is a strong level.36 Thus, a score of 30% means that the judge, or Court, exhibits a 
weak level of precedential behaviour. In other words, precedent has very little influence. This 
result would be consistent with the attitudinal model, whereas a score of 75% would be 
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CHAPTER 4 
Results and Discussion 
The first stage of the current research is based on a content analysis of the published 
judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada from 2004. All of the judgments reported on the 
Supreme Court’s website for that year were included.1 This results in a sample of eighty-two 
cases; however, two cases were excluded because the reasons for judgment were not reported 
on the Court’s website.2 Some of the more noteworthy decisions from that year include a case 
dealing with the right of parents to physically discipline their children (also known as the 
“spanking case”)3, a decision relating to the Air India bombing,4 and the same-sex marriage 
reference.5
The 80 cases produced a total of 5112 paragraphs, for an average of 63.9 paragraphs 
per opinion. Not surprisingly, the aforementioned “spanking case,” which is perhaps the most 
divisive case the Court dealt with in 2004, produced the most paragraphs at 246. Four 
judgments tied for having the fewest number of paragraphs at 1. In terms of the opinion type, 
4001 (78.3 percent) of the paragraphs were part of majority opinions, 105 paragraphs (2.1 
percent) were part of concurring opinions, and 696 (13.6 percent) were part of dissenting 
opinions. In addition, 41 paragraphs (.8 percent) were classified as partial concurrences, and 
269 paragraphs (5.3 percent) were partial dissents.
1 See Appendix A for the list of cases used in the content analysis.
2 The excluded cases are R. v. Deschamplain, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 601, 2004 SCC 76; and R. v. Sazant, [2004]
3 S.C.R. 635, 2004 SCC77.
3 Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (A.G.), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76.
4 Re. Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248; Re. Vancouver Sun, [2004] 2
S.C.R. 332.
5 Ref. Re. Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698.


















The Court 84 1.6
Total 5112 100.0
Table 4.1 presents the number of paragraphs authored by each of the eleven Justices 
who participated during 2004, as well as a category for those opinions signed by “The 
Court.” Five of the Justices combined to author approximately two-thirds of all the 
paragraphs. As Table 4.1 shows, Justice Binnie authored 1002 paragraphs (19.6 percent), 
which was more than any other member of the Court in 2004. Justice LeBel authored the 
second highest number of paragraphs at 705 which represents 13.8 percent of all the 
paragraphs included in the sample. Chief Justice McLachlin was third with 613 paragraphs 
(12 percent), followed by Justices Bastarache and Fish, who authored 540 (10.6 percent) and 
533 (10.4 percent) paragraphs respectively. Justice Charron, one of the newest members of 
the Court, authored the least number of paragraphs, with 8 or .2 percent of the total number 
of paragraphs from 2004.
Justice Binnie authored the greatest number of majority opinion paragraphs with 796. 
The Chief Justice is second at 568 majority paragraphs, followed by Justice Fish with 431
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and Justice Iacobucci with 430. Justice LeBel authored 53 concurring paragraphs and 159 
dissenting paragraphs which is more than any other Justice in either category. The second 
most frequent dissenter measured by number of paragraphs is Justice Bastarache at 152, 
while Justice Binnie was third with 135 dissenting paragraphs.
Table 4.2 presents the seven modes of argument and the number of times the Court 
invoked each in its judgments from 2004. It shows that slightly more than one-quarter (27 
percent) of all paragraphs were devoted to explaining the background and litigation history of 
the cases. This is to be expected, as the case facts are regarded as important by all three of the 
models of judicial decision-making discussed in Chapter Two. An additional 26.1 percent of 
the paragraphs were classified as “Other,” meaning that they did not rely on any of the modes 
of argument included in the analysis. Most of the paragraphs coded as “Other” were either 
instances in which the author applied die law to the facts of the case being considered, 
addressed an argument raised by another Justice in the same case, or paragraphs containing 
the disposition of the case.
Table 4.2 
Frequency of Mode of Argumen:
Mode of Argument Frequency Percent
Case Background 1380 27.0
Constitutional/Statutory Text 834 16.3
Legislative Materials 63 1.2
Precedent 1283 25.1
Scholarly Materials 161 3.1
Briefs 10 .2
Social Science 26 .5
Higher Law Sources 21 .4
Other 1334 26.1
Total 5112 100.0
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The data in Table 4.2 confirm the initial hypothesis that the Court invokes arguments 
based on precedent more frequently than any other source. Specifically, the Court referred to 
precedents in 1283 paragraphs, which represents 25.1 percent of the total number of 
paragraphs. The next most frequently used mode of argument are those based on die wording 
of statutory and constitutional texts. The Court relied on arguments from textual sources in 
834 (16.3 percent) of the paragraphs. The Court referred to scholarly materials in 161 
paragraphs, which represents 3.1 percent of the total number of paragraphs. Legislative 
materials such as Parliamentary debates and committee reports were used by the Court in 1.2 
percent of the paragraphs, followed by social science evidence at .5 percent, higher law 
sources at .4 percent, and briefs were the least used mode of argument at .2 percent.
Considered alone, the Court’s use of precedent to justify its decisions suggests that 
legal factors are an important part of judicial decision-making. However, the salience of legal 
factors appears even greater when the variables associated with the legal model are combined 
and compared to the variables associated with the attitudinal model. The three variables 
(modes of argument) associated with the legal model are constitutional/statutory texts, 
legislative materials, and precedent. The Court referred to variables associated with the legal 
model in 2180 paragraphs, which, as the pie chart in Figure 4.A illustrates, represents 42.6 
percent of the total number of paragraphs. When combined, the variables associated with the 
attitudinal model, including scholarly materials, briefs, social science evidence, and higher 
law sources, were invoked in a mere 218 or 4.3 percent of the paragraphs.
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Figure 4. A











A cross tabulation between the various modes of argument and case types was 
also conducted. It reveals that almost half (49.4 percent) of the 1283 paragraphs which 
rely on precedent were from statutory cases, while 37.9 percent came in constitutional 
cases, and the remaining 12.7 percent were from “Other” types of cases such as those 
involving common law rules. Moreover, 80.8 percent of all arguments based on social 
science evidence occurred in constitutional cases, compared to 19.2 percent in statutory 
cases. Finally, 71.4 percent of all arguments based on higher law sources came in 
constitutional cases. It is clear from this that the Court relies on different types of 
arguments depending on the type of case it is deciding. Specifically, in 2004 the Justices 
were more likely to use briefs, social science evidence, and higher law sources to justify
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their constitutional decisions, whereas textual sources, legislative materials, and 
precedent were the preferred justificatory devices in statutory cases.
Thus, the content analysis has substantiated the initial hypothesis that precedent 
specifically, and variables associated with the legal model generally, were used by the 
Court more than any other mode of argument to justify its decisions in 2004. However, it 
should be stated that these results are not necessarily generalizable to other years or 
applicable to other courts. The results simply demonstrate that precedent was the most 
frequently used mode of argument by the Supreme Court in 2004. Moreover, although 
the findings of the analysis parallel the results of previous research conducted in Canada 
and the U.S., they are subject to changes in the Court’s personnel and agenda. Different 
judges use different modes of argument to justify their decisions. Furthermore, changes in 
the subject matter of the Court’s agenda may result in the use o f alternative modes of 
argument. For example, based on the present analysis it is reasonable to hypothesize that 
an increase in the number of statutory cases that the Court decides in a given term is 
likely to produce a concomitant increase in the use of textual sources by the Justices.
Perhaps more importantly, the results of this study do not prove that precedent 
influences the way in which the Justices decide cases. As the attitudinalists and realists 
have noted, factors such as precedent are used by judges to conceal their personal 
preferences which are the actual basis for their decisions. Despite these shortcomings, the 
forgoing analysis has been employed primarily to establish the salience of precedent, and 
the legal model, in the content of judicial opinions. The remaining sections of the current 
research will specifically examine the influence of precedent on judicial behaviour.
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Having established the prominence of precedent in the Supreme Court’s opinions, the 
second section of the research examines the influence of stare decisis in cases which alter 
precedent since 1950. It is divided into two parts: die first analyzes the characteristics of 
altering and altered decisions; the second explores the influence of precedent on the votes of 
the Justices in precedent altering cases.
An examination of the Supreme Court’s published judgments since 1950, as well 
as academic literature, resulted in a list of 45 decisions which alter 61 precedents. The list 
of precedent altering-decisions along with the decisions that were altered appears in 
Appendix B. It also includes the “method of alteration,” which is the specific language used 
by the Court in the “cases cited” section, such as “overruled” or “not followed,” as well as 
the primary reason for altering the precedent.
The first precedent altering decision occurred in 1961; the most recent was in 2004.
In 1985, the Court altered precedent in five cases, which is more than in any other year. The 
Court altered four precedents in 1987 and 1999, which was the second most in a single year. 
Between 1950 and 1984, the Court altered precedent in 12 cases. From 1985 to the present, 
the Court altered precedent on 33 occasions. The increased frequency of alterations since 
1985 is consistent with the hypothesis that the Charter provided the Court with a mandate to 
alter its previous jurisprudence.
Chief Justice Dickson presided over the most alterations of precedent, 22 (36.1 
percent), followed by Lamer with 17 (27.9 percent). Brian Dickson was appointed as Chief 
Justice in 1984, shortly after the first Charter case made its way onto the Court’s docket. In 
1990, Antonio Lamer was elevated to the position of Chief Justice. Together, Dickson and 
Lamer presided over more alterations of precedent than all of the other Chief Justices since 
1950 combined. It is no coincidence that they were also the first two Chief Justices of the
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Charter era during which Canadian law underwent significant doctrinal changes. Conversely, 
under the leadership of BoraLaskin, there were 13 (21.3 percent) precedent altering 
decisions. The current Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin has presided over 5 (8.2 percent) 
alterations of precedent, followed by Kerwin and Fauteux with 2 (3.3 percent) each.
In the majority of their precedent-altering decisions (75 .4 percent), the Justices 
exhibited a high level of agreement. Determining the level of agreement was not a simple as 
counting the number of Justices in the majority and minority. For instance, in R. v. Burke, 
Justices McLachlin, L’ Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, and Bastarache dissented as to the outcome 
of the case, but agreed with the majority that the rule established in R. v. Head relating to the 
ability of a judge to reconvene a jury after it has been discharged should be altered.6 In 
contrast, moderate levels of agreement appeared in 8.2 percent of the Court’s precedent- 
altering decisions, while 16.4 percent were altered with a low level of agreement. The data 
clearly indicate that when the Court decides to alter precedent, it has generally done so with a 
high level of agreement among die participating Justices.
The altered precedents vary in age from 2 years to 109, for an average of 30.21 years. 
When placed into an age-range categories, 31.1 percent of altered decisions are forty-one 
years or older, 4.9 percent are thirty-one to forty years old, 11.5 percent are twenty-one to 
thirty, 27.9 percent are eleven to twenty, and the remaining 24.6 percent are ten years old or 
less. Fifty-three of the altered precedents (86 .9 percent) were decisions of the Supreme Court 
of Canada, while the remaining 8(13.1 percent) were decisions of the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council or some other English court of appeal. Interestingly, the Court exhibited a 
high level of agreement in all of the decisions that altered an English precedent.
6 R. v. Burke. 120021 2 S.C.R.
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Table 4.3
Cross tabulation of the Level of Agreement and Aee of Altered Deeisk' 
_________  Level of Agreement______________________
Age of Altered
Decision




High Level of 
Agreement Total
0-to-10 3 (20.0%) 3 (20.0%) 9 (60.0%) 15(100.0%)
11 -to-20 7 (38.9%) 1 (5.6%) 10(55.6%) 18(100.0%)
21-to-30 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 6 (100.0%) 6(100.0%)
31-to-40 0 (.0%) 1 (33.3%) 2 (66.7%) 3 (100.0%)
41 and older 0 (.0%) 0 (.0%) 19 (100.0%) 19(100.0%)
Total
10 (16.4%) 5 (8.2%) 46 (75.4%) 61 (100%)
In addition, the data indicate the possibility of a relationship between the level of 
agreement among the Justices in cases that alter precedent and the age of the altered 
precedent. In particular, Table 4.3 presents a cross tabulation of the level of agreement and 
the ages of altered precedents, and shows, inter alia, that 100 percent of the altered 
precedents forty-one years or older were altered with a high level of agreement. In their 
study, Brenner and Spaeth hypothesized that “older precedents would tend to be overruled by 
a unanimous or nearly unanimous vote, while newer precedents would tend to be overruled 
by a minimum winning or close vote.”7 This was based on the belief that judges have less 
attachment or loyalty to older decisions, at least in part because they likely did not participate 
in the older decision. However, it could also mean that the precedent simply outlived its 
usefulness.
7 Saul Brenner and Harold J. Spaeth, Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of Precedent on the Supreme Court. 
1946 -  1992 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 32.
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Although it may seem reasonable, based on the data in Table 4.3, to conclude that 
Brenner and Spaeth’s hypothesis holds true for the Supreme Court of Canada, there are 
reasons to question the validity of that position. Specifically, the majority of decisions in each 
of the age-range categories were altered with a high level of agreement among the Justices. 
Moreover, 100 percent of the altered precedents between the ages of twenty-one and thirty 
were altered with high levels of agreement. Low levels of agreement were found in only 10 
of the total 61 altered precedents (16.4 percent). The highest proportion of decisions altered 
by low levels of agreement fell into the 1 l-to-20 age-range category. Thus, while not 
completely negating the possibility of a connection between age and level of agreement, the 
prevalence of high levels of agreement in all age-range categories substantially diminishes 
the significance of any association.
The reasons for altering precedent are presented in Table 4.4. It shows that the largest 
proportion of alterations, 31.1 percent, occurred because the Justices felt that the precedent 
was wrongly decided. For example, in Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta, the Court 
overturned a five-year old precedent pertaining to adverse effects discrimination and the duty 
of employers to accommodate their employees, conceding that, “the majority of this Court 
may have indeed erred” in the original precedent.8
The need to update the law in a particular area was offered as the primary reason 
given by the Court for altering precedent in 19.7 percent of the cases, especially those 
involving common law rules and doctrines. A prime example of this type of alteration is the 
case of Hamstra v. B.C. Rugby Union9 Hamstra was rendered quadriplegic in a rugby match 
organized by the B.C. Ruby Union. He subsequently initiated an action claiming negligence
8 Central Alberta Daily Pool v. Alberta, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489, par. 51
s Hamstra v. B.C. Rugby Union, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1092. [hereinafter Hamstra]
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on the part of the Rugby Union. During the trial, several witnesses made reference to the 
possibility that the Rugby Union was insured.
Table 4.4 
Basis for Altering Precedent
Basis for Altering
Precedent Frequency Percent
The Charter 12 19.7
Need to update 
law 12 19.7





attenuated by 11 18.0
other cases
Expands criminal 1 1.6liability
Total 61 100.0
Believing that the references could be prejudicial to their defence, the Rugby Union 
brought a motion seeking to have the jury discharged, which the trial judge granted. The trial 
judge’s decision to discharge the jury rested on the common law rule articulated by die 
Supreme Court in Bowhey v. Theakston, that a “jury should be discharged automatically if 
something occurs from which the jury might reasonably infer that the defendant is insured.”10 
In Hamstra, the Supreme Court unanimously overruled Theakston, arguing that the rule was 
outdated since the prevalence of insurance in society today is widely known.11
Since the mid-1980s, the Court has altered 12 precedents (19.7 percent) because of 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. One of the first cases in which the Charter required the 
Court to alter a precedent was II v. Big M  Drug Mart.12 At issue in Big M  was whether the 
federal Lord’s Day Act, which prohibited certain forms of work and business activity on
10 Bowhey v. Theakston, [1951] S.C.R. 679.
11 Hamstra, 1094.
12 R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
78
Sundays, infringed the right to freedom of conscience and religion as guaranteed by section 
2(a) of the Charter. In addition to finding the Lord’s Day Act unconstitutional, the Court 
refused to follow its decision in Robertson and Rosetanni, a case from 1963 in which the Act 
was upheld in a challenge based on the Bill of Rights. Justice Dickson, who authored the 
majority opinion in Big M, explicitly rejected the narrow meaning of “freedom of religion” 
espoused by the majority in Robertson and Rosetanni.13
According to the majority in Robertson and Rosentanni, the Bill of Rights was “not 
concerned with ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’ in any abstract sense, but rather 
with such ‘rights and freedoms’ as they existed in Canada immediately before the statute was 
enacted.”14 Professor Manfredi argues that the reasoning in Robertson and Rosetanni is 
grounded in a “discredited ‘frozen concepts’ theory of rights,” under which rights and 
freedoms are construed narrowly rendering them incapable of growth and development.15 
The Court’s decision in BigM  is significant because it stands for the proposition that rights 
and freedoms under the Charter should be generously interpreted.16 Furthermore, the case 
provides an excellent illustration of the Charter requiring the Court to update and alter its 
jurisprudence.
The Court altered 11 precedents (18 percent) on the basis that they had been 
attenuated by other cases. A precedent is attenuated when the foundation on which it was 
decided is substantially eroded or undermined by subsequent judgments of the Supreme 
Court. For example, in Vetrovec v. The Queen, the Justices refused to follow a decision of the 
House of Lords governing the corroboration of accomplice testimony, arguing that the
13 Ibid.. 349.
4 Robertson and Rosetanni v. The Queen, [1963] S.C.R. 651.
15 Christopher Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and the Paradox of Liberal 
Constitutionalism 2“  Edition (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001), 54.
16 Ibid.
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decision had been “cast aside” by English courts and undermined by the two recent 
judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada.17
The Court altered six precedents (9.8 percent) because the decisions proved to be 
unworkable or created uncertainty for lower court judges. Perhaps the best example of a 
decision being altered because it creates uncertainty is Minister o f Indian Affairs v. Ranville, 
where the Court overruled its decision in Commonwealth o f Puerto Rico v. Hernandez. For 
the majority, Justice Dickson stated that Hernandez should be overruled because, “in this 
instance adherence to the stare decisis principle would generate more uncertainty than 
certainty.18 After all, one of the traditional justifications for following a policy of stare 
decisis is to promote legal certainty and predictability. Hence, a decision that creates 
uncertainty undermines the purpose of stare decisis and should therefore be overruled.
In another case, Heredi v. Fensom, the Court unanimously overruled a series of 
precedents pertaining to the meaning of the phrase “damages occasioned by a motor vehicle” 
in the Saskatchewan Highway Traffic Act. The Justices maintained that the applicable 
precedents were unclear and failed to provide adequate guidance to lower court judges.19 For 
these reasons, the Court overruled the line of precedents.
The only case in which the Court altered a precedent because it had the effect of 
expanding criminal liability is II v. Chaulk. At issue in Chaulk was the Criminal Code 
definition of the term “wrong” as it applies to the defence of insanity.20 For the majority, 
Lamer C. J. announced that the Court was prepared to overrule its decision in Schwartz v. The 
Queen, which had previously governed the meaning of the term “wrong” in the context of the 
insanity defence. In his opinion, Chief Justice Lamer referred to the factors outlined by
17 Vetrovec v. The Queen, [19821 1 S.C.R. 811
18 Min. of Indian Affairs v. Ranville, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 51&.
19 Heredi v. Fenson, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 741, par. 31 -  32.
20 R. v. Chaulk, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303.
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Dickson C.I, as he then was, in Bernard that would support a decision to overrule an earlier 
judgment. According to Lamer C. J., “the fourth factor that was discussed by Dickson C. J., 
and that is directly relevant to the case at bar, is whether the prior judgment... is unfavourable 
to an accused in that it expands the scope of criminal liability beyond acceptable limits.”21 In 
the view of the majority, Schwartz had the effect of expanding criminal liability to include 
persons who are incapable, because of a disease of the mind, of knowing that an act was 
wrong.22 On that basis, the definition of “wrong” from Schwartz was overruled.
Having examined the characteristics of Supreme Court decisions that alter precedent, 
the analysis now addresses the influence of stare decisis on the votes of the Justices in 
precedent-altering decisions. The sample for this section was drawn from the list of altering 
and altered precedents, and included only those Justices who participated in a precedent- 
altering decision as well as in the altered decision. Application of these criteria produced a 
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Table 4.5
Support for Institutional and Personal Stare Decisis by Justice
Justice












Taschereau I I (100%)
Locke 1 1 (100%)
Abbott 1 1 (100%) 1 (100%)
Martland 6 3 (50%) 5 (83.3%) 1 (16.7%)
Judson 4 2 (50%) 2 (50%) 2 (50%)
Ritchie 8 3 (37.5%) 4 (50%) 4 (50%)
Hall 1 1 (100%)
Spence 3 1 (33.3%) 1 (33.3%) 2 (66.7%)
Laskin 2 2 (100%)
Dickson 6 2(33.3) 4 (66.7%)
Beetz 3 3 (100%)
deGrandpre 1 1 (100%) 1 (100%)
Estey 1 1 (100%)
McIntyre 1 1 (100%) 1 (100%)
Chouinard 1 1 (100%)
Lamer 5 2 (40%) 3 (60%)
Wilson 1 1 (100%)
L’Heureux- 2 2 (100%)
Dube
Gonthier 3 3 (100%)
Cory 2 2 (100%)
McLachlin 4 1 (25%) 3 (75%)
Iacobucci 2 1 (50%) 1 (50%)
Major 1 1 (100%)
Bastarache 1 1 (100%)
Binnie 1 1 (100%)
Total 62 12 (19.4%) 28 (45.2%) 34 (54.8%)
The data displayed in Table 4.5 show the number of pairs of altering and altered 
decisions that each Justice has participated in, and the number votes compatible with the 
legal model (institutional stare decisis), personal stare decisis, and neither. On an individual 
basis, only six of the twenty-five Justices voted compatibly with the legal model version of
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stare decisis at a rate above 33 percent. Moreover, fourteen Justices voted compatibly with 
personal stare decisis at a rate 34 percent or above. Thus, the data confirms the first major 
hypothesis, which is that a majority of Justices exhibit a low level of support for the legal 
model (33 percent or less), and moderate to high levels of support for personal stare decisis 
(34 percent and above).
Considered collectively, the Justices voted compatibly with the legal model version 
of stare decisis in 19.4 percent of the cases. In contrast, the Justices voted compatibly with 
personal stare decisis in 45.2 percent of the cases, which is a moderate level of support. This 
verifies the second major hypothesis that the Justices exhibit a low level of support (less than 
33 percent) for the legal model version of stare decisis, and a moderate to high level of 
support for institutional stare decisis.
Three Justices, Abbott, de Grandpre, and McIntyre supported the legal model version 
of precedent at a rate of 100 percent. However, each participated in only one pair of cases. If 
they are excluded, Justices Martland and Judson are the most supportive of the legal model, 
followed by Ritchie. Justice Martland participated in six pairs of cases, and voted compatibly 
with legal stare decisis in three pairs (50 percent). This means that Martland was opposed to 
the alteration of precedent in 50 percent of the cases. Judson participated in six pairs of cases 
and voted according to institutional stare decisis in three (50 percent). In his approximately 
twenty-five year career as a Supreme Court Justice, Roland Ritchie took part in eight pairs of 
cases, which is more than any other Justice, and conformed to the legal model in three (37.5 
percent).
For example, in Brant Dairy Co. Ltd. v. Milk Commission o f Ontario et al.23,
Martland joined Abbott, Judson, and Ritchie in opposing the alteration of the Court’s
23 Brant Dairy Co. Ltd.. v. Milk Commissioner of Ontario, [1973] S.C.R. 131.
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precedent in Robbins et al. v. Ontario Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers ’Marketing Board24, an 
administrative law case dealing with the power of the Milk Commission to delegate authority 
to make regulations. Martland and Judson had been part of the majority in Robbins, thereby 
making their votes in Brant Dairy consistent with both institutional and personal stare 
decisis. In Bell v. The Queen25, a case concerning the reasonableness of a municipal zoning 
by-law, Martland voted against altering the Court’s decision from six years earlier in City o f 
Toronto v. Polai.26 Martland’s vote in Bell is also consistent with institutional and personal 
stare decisis.
In Keizer v. Hanna27, Justices Judson and de Grandpre dissented from the alteration 
of the Court’s decision in Gehrmann v. Lavoie. Both cases involved die awarding of damages 
following fatal car accidents. The majority in Keizer held that the rule articulated in 
Gehrmann governing the calculation of damages should be altered to account for the “impact 
of income tax.”28 Based on the coding conventions, Judson and de Grandpre’s dissenting 
votes in Keizer are considered consistent with institutional and personal stare decisis.
As seen in Table 4.6, the Justices’ votes conform to personal stare decisis in 45.2 
percent of the pairs of cases, which is more than twice the number of votes that conform to 
institutional precedent. The salience of judicial conformity to personal stare decisis in cases 
that alter precedent lends support to the position that when rendering decisions, judges strive 
to achieve consistency with their past judgments. From this perspective, judges act 
strategically to maintain or enhance their reputation as consistent jurists. However, it is also 
possible that when judges conform to personal stare decisis, it is because their decisions are
24 Robbins et al. v. Ontario Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers Marketing Board, [1965] S.C.R. 431.
Sell v. The Queen, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 212.
26 City of Toronto v. Polai, [1973] S.C.R. 38.
27 Keizer v. Hanna, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 342.
28 Ibid., 347.
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the result of a specific attitude toward the issue(s) raised in a particular case, rather than a 
conscious attempt to be consistent.
Table 4.6










Taschereau 1 (100%) 1
Locke 1 (100%) 1
Abbott 1 (100%) 1
Martland 3 (50%) 2 (33.3%) 1 (16.7%) 6
Judson 2 (50%) 2 (50%) 4
Ritchie 3 (37.5%) 1 (12.5%) 4 (50%) 8
Hall 1 (100%) 1
Spence 1 (33.3%) 2 (66.7%) 3
Laskin 2 (100%) 2
Dickson 2 (33.3%) 4 (66.7%) 6
Beetz 3 (100%) 3
de Grandpre 1 (100%) 1
Estey 1 (100%) 1
McIntyre 1 (100%) 1
Chouinard 1 (100%) 1
Lanier 2 (40%) 3 (60%) 5
Wilson 1 (100%) 1
L’Heureux-Dubc 2 (100%) 2
Gonthier 3 (100%) 3
Cory 2 (100%) 2
McLachlin 1 (33.3%) 3 (66.7%) 4
Iacobucci 1 (50%) 1 (50%) 2
Major 1 (100%) 1
Bastarache 1 (100%) 1
Binnie 1 (100%) 1
Total 14 (22.6%) 14 (22.6%) 34 (54.8%) 0 62
Attention should also be given to the number of votes which do not conform to either 
form of stare decisis. Specifically, over half of the Justices’ votes (54.8 percent) were 
classified as consistent with neither institutional or personal stare decisis. This is further 
illustrated by examining Table 4.6, which displays the patterns of the Justices’ membership 
in majority and minority opinion coalitions in the altered and altering decisions. Interestingly,
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majority-majority voting (54.8 percent) predominates by 32.2 percent over majority-minority 
and minority-majority voting (22.6 percent each). There is no example of a Justice being in 
the minority in both the altered and altering decisions. The prevalence of majority-majority 
voting is difficult to explain since it means that a Justice voted with the majority in the 
precedent and in the altering decision.
One possible explanation for the prevalence of majority-majority voting patterns is 
the power of institutional norms such as collegiality and unanimity. Justice Wilson maintains 
that on a collegial tribunal such as the Supreme Court, the justices are obligated to “strive for 
a consensus, or at least to submerge individuality in the interests of fewer sets of 
reasons... .”29 Thus, as proponents of the strategic model expect, institutional norms which 
stress collegiality and unanimity may lead some justices to join opinions that they do not 
entirely agree with.
Alternatively, other strategic scholars hypothesize that majority-majority voting 
patterns may be part of a long-term political strategy, whereby a justice supports the position 
favoured by another justice, in exchange for the support of that justice in a subsequent case. 
The final, and perhaps simplest explanation for majority-majority voting is that justices want 
to be on the “winning” (majority) side, especially in important cases.
The results of the foregoing analysis indicate that the form of precedent associated 
with the legal model of judicial behaviour has had a very limited influence on the votes of 
Canadian Supreme Court Justices in cases that alter precedent. However, these findings are 
limited to cases in which the Court alters precedent and cannot be generalized to include the 
entire population of Supreme Court judgments. Moreover, the results are inherently biased 
because the analysis focused specifically on precedent-altering decisions. Since the majority
29 Bertha Wilson. “Decision-Making in the Supreme Court,” University of Toronto Caw Journal 36 (1986): 
236.
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of Justices voted in favour of altering precedent, support for the legal model is expected to be 
low. For these reasons, additional research on the influence of precedent in regular cases is 
required.
In order to assess the influence of precedent on the decisions of the Supreme Court of 
Canada it was necessary to first compile a list of precedent-setting cases and their progeny.
This proved to be an extremely tedious task, as it required examining every volume of the 
Supreme Court Reports from 1950 to the present, recording almost every dissenting vote, and 
grouping precedent and progeny cases based on citation patterns and similarities among 
cases. Construction of the list was aided by scholarly literature, however, considering the 
paucity of data related to this subject, it offered minimal assistance.
The result is a list of 295 cases, comprised of 114 precedent-setting cases and 181 
progeny cases. Moreover, the progeny cases produced a total of 291 votes which were 
classified according to whether they are preferential (consistent with the judge’s revealed 
preference) or precedential (conform to existing precedent). Progeny votes were further 
classified into one of three categories representing strong, moderate, and weak levels of 
expression. The list of precedent and progeny cases showing each Justice’s vote appears in 
Table 4.7. It does not purport to be exhaustive; given the amount of information involved, it 
is reasonable to expect that a few cases have been inadvertently missed. The progeny cases 
have been indented, and are located directly below the precedents to which they correspond. 
The Justices’ names are used to represent their votes in the progeny cases. They appear next 
to the name of progeny case, in either the preference or precedent column.
To save space, the Justices’ names have been abbreviated as follows: Loc-Locke; Est- 
J.W. Estey; Cart-Cartwright; Ker-Kerwin; Ran-Rand; Fau-Fauteux; Tas-Taschereau; Abt- 
Abbott; Sp-Spence; Hall-Hail; Jud-Judson; Rit-Ritchie; Pig-Pigeon; Las-Laskin; Dck- 
Dickson; Gra-de Grandpre; Btz-Beetz; Lam-Lamer; Mcy-Mclntyre; Dain-Le Dain; Wil-
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Wilson; For-La Forest; Est2-W.Z. Estey; Dube-L’Heureux-Dube; Sop-Sopinka; McL- 
McLachlin; Cor-Cory; Gon-Gonthier; Maj-Major; Bas-Bastarache; Arb-Arbour; Bin-Binnie; 
LeB-LeBel; Des-Deschamps.
In addition, a bracketed number appears next to each vote indicating the level of 
expression ((1) = strong pref/prec; (2) = moderate; (3) = weak). Finally, a single asterisk (*) 
appears before the name of Justices who did not participate in the original precedent case, but 
dissented in one of its progeny and relied on that dissent in subsequent cases. Two asterisks 
(**) appear before the names of judges who, instead of dissenting in progeny cases, file 
concurring opinions but which express disagreement on some point that led the judge to 
dissent in the precedent decision.
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Table 4.7 
Votes in Precedent and Progenv Va&
Precedent/Progeny______________________________________ Preference
Min. of Nat. Revenue v. T.E. McCool Ltd. [1950]
Joggins Coal Co. Ltd. v. Min. of Nat. Revenue [1950]
C.P.R. Co. v. A.G. Sask. [1951]
C.P.R. Co. v. City of Winnipeg [1952]
The King v. The Assessors of the Town of Sunny Brae [1952]
Comp. Auth. & Pub. Assoc, of Can. v. Kiwanis Club [1953]
Wilder v. Min. of Nat. Revenue [1952]
Min. of Nat. Revenue v. Wain Town Gas & Oil Co. Ltd. [1952]
Azoulay v. The Queen [1952]
Cathro v. The Queen [1956] Fau(2)
Marsh v. Kulchar [1952]
King v. Colonial Homes Ltd. et al. [1956]
Marsden Kooler Trans. Ltd et al. v. Pollock [1953]
Archibald et al. v. Nesting et al. [1953] Loc(1)
Brusch v. The Queen [1953]
Parkes v. The Queen [1956]
Toronto Newspaper Guild v. Globe Printing Co. [1953]
Labour Relations Board v. Traders’ Service Ltd. [1958] Cart(1)
Kelsey v. The Queen [1953]
Binet v. The Queen [1954] Cart(3)
Regent Vending Machines Ltd. v. Alb. Vending Machines [1954]
Johnson v. A.G. Alberta [1954] Ker(2)-Est(2)
DeWare v. The Queen [1954] Ker(2)-Est(2)
Min. of Nat. Revenue v. Anaconda American Brass Ltd. [1954]
Wilson v. Min. of Nat. Revenue [1955] Est(3)
Min. of Nat. Revenue v. Trans Can. Investment Co. Ltd. [1956] Est(3)













C.P.R. & Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Turta at al. [1954]
Prudential Trust Co. Ltd. v. Registrar, Humboldt [1957]
Eli Lilly & Co. Ltd. v. Min. of Nat. Revenue [1955]
Canadian General Electric Co. v. Min. of Nat. Revenue [1962]
Boucher v. The Queen [1955]
Provencher v. The Queen [1956]
Stevenson v. Reliance Petroleum Ltd. [1956]
Irving Oil Co. Ltd. v. Can. General Insurance Co. [1958]
Prudential Trust Co. Ltd. v. Cugnet [1956]
Prudential Trust Co. Ltd. v. Olsen [1960]
Bradley v. The Queen [1956]
The Queen v. Cote [1964]
Silvestro v. The Queen [1965]
The Queen v. Lemire [1965]
Wild v. The Queen [1971]
The Queen v. Bagshaw [1972]
The Queen v. Paul [1977]
City of Westmount v. Montreal Trans. Comm. [1958]
City of Outremont v. Montreal Trans. Comm. [1958]
Goldhar v. The Queen [1960]
Goldhar v. The Queen [1960]
In Re Darby [1964]
Frobisher v. Canadian Pipelines & Petroleums Ltd. [1960] 
City of Halifax v. Vaughan Construction Co. Ltd. [1961]
O’Grady v. Sparling [1960]
Mann v. The Queen [1966]
Mclverv. The Queen [1966]
Irrigation Industries Ltd. v. Min. of Nat. Revenue [1962] 
Montreal Trust Co. v. Min. of Nat. Revenue [1962]
Robertson & Rosetanni v. The Queen [1963]

























Koury v. The Queen [1964]
Guimond v. The Queen [1979]
Roumieu v. Osborne [1965]
Corrie v. Gilbert [1965]
Re Martin; MacGregarv. Ryan [1965]
National Trust Co. Ltd. v. Fleury et al. [1965]
The Queen v. Devereux [1965]
The Queen v. George [1966]
Daniels v. White & The Queen [1968]
Gordon v. The Queen [1965]
Poole v. The Queen [1967]
Klippert v. The Queen [1967]
Bingham v. The Queen [1971]
Sterling Trust Co. v. Postma et al. [1965]
Vana v. Tosta et al. [1968]
Winnipeg Supply & Fuel Co. Ltd. v. Winnipeg [1966] 
King Edward Properties Ltd. v. Winnipeg [1967] 












Mapa et al. v. Township of North York et al. [1967]
Ample Investments Ltd. v. Township of North York [1967]Mart(1) 
Tashan Ltd. v. Township of North York et al. [1967] Mart(1)
Hadden v. The Queen [1968]
Poole v. The Queen [1968]
Mendick v. The Queen [1969] 
Hatchwell v. The Queen [1976]
Paton v. The Queen [1968]
Sanders v. The Queen [1970]
De Clercq v. The Queen [1968]
R v. Gauthier [1977]
Sunbeam Co. Ltd. v. The Queen [1969] 












Vinnal v. The Queen [1970]
Alexandroff v. The Queen [1970]
Levesque v. Comeau et al. [1970]
The Queen v. Lupien [1970]
Perrault v. The Queen [1971]
The Queen v. Wray [1971]
John v. The Queen [1971]
The Queen v. Nord-Deutsche et al. [1971]
The Ship Arthur Stove v. Stoneffax et al. [1971]
Piche v. The Queen [1971]
Powell v. The Queen [1977]
Erven v. The Queen [1979]
Judson v. Governors of the University of Toronto [1972] 
Kalinin v. Metro Toronto [1972]
Metro Toronto v. Loblaw Co. Ltd [1972]
Brownridge v. The Queen [1972]
Taraschuk v. The Queen [1977]
Chromiak v. The Queen [1980]
Arthurs v. The Queen [1974]
Harrison v. The Queen [1975]
Adgey v. The Queen [1975]
Caccamo v. The Queen [1976]
Ross v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles for Quebec [1975] 
Bell v. A.G. P.E.I. [1975]
Kienapple v. The Queen [1975]
Dore v. A.G. Canada [1975]
Sheppe v. The Queen [1980]
The Queen v. Burnshire [1975]


























Hogan v. The Queen [1975]
Rilling v. The Queen [1976]
Jumaga v. The Queen [1977]
The Queen v. Hamm [1977]
Puerto Rico v. Hernandez [1975]
Vardy v. Scott [1977]
Ross Southward Tire v. Pyrotech Products [1976] 
Agnew-Surpass v. Cummer-Yonge [1976]
T. Eaton Company v. Smith et al. [1978] 
Greenwood Shopping Plaza v. Beattie [1980]
Ref. Re Anti-Inflation Act [1976]
Man. Gov’t Employees Assoc, v. Manitoba [1978]
Faber v. The Queen [1976]
The Queen v. Hauser [1979]
Schwartz v. The Queen [1977]
Cooper v. The Queen [1980]
Kjeldsen v. The Queen [1981]
Rv. Abbey [1982]
Hill v. The Queen [1977]
R v. Gardiner [1982]
Mulligan v. The Queen [1977]
Leary v. The Queen [1978]
Young v. The Queen [1981]
R v. Quin [1988]


















Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. C.R.T.C. [1978]
Public Service Board v. Dionne [1978] Pig(1)-Btz(2)-Gra(2)
Rosen v. The Queen [1980]
Goldman v. The Queen [1980] Las(1)





Pappajohn v. The Queen [1980]
Sansregret v. The Queen [1985]
Four B. Man. Ltd. v. United Garment Workers et al. [1980]
The Queen v. Sutherland [1980]
Rothman v. The Queen [1981]
Amato v. The Queen [1982] Las(2)-Est2(2)
Ford v. The Queen [1982]
The Queen v. Toews [1985]
R v. Therens [1985]
Trask v. The Queen [1985]
Rahn v. The Queen [1985]
R v. Thomsen [1988]
Dubois v. The Queen [1985]
R v. Mannion [1986]
Bilodeau v. A.G. Manitoba [1986]
Macdonald v. City of Montreal [1986] Wil(3)
Mills v. The Queen [1986]
Carter v. The Queen [1986 
R v. Kalan [1989]
Mezzo v. The Queen [1986]
R v. Monteleone [1987]
R v. Jacobs [1988]
R v. Hare [1989]
R v. Hall [1989]
R v. Collins [1987]
R v. Sieben [1987]
R v. Ham ill [1987]
R v. Pohoretsky [1987]
R v. Manninen [1987]
R v. Dairy Supplies Ltd. [1988]
Table 4.7
























Ref. Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alb.) [1987]
P.S.A.C. v. Canada [1987] Dck(1)-Wil(1)
R.W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan [1987] Wil(2)
United States v. Allard [1987] Lam(1)
R v. Wigglesworth [1987]
Burnham v. Metro Toronto Police [1987]
Trumbley & Pugh v. Metro Toronto Police [1987]
Trimm v. Durham Regional Police [1987]
R v. Vaillancourt [1987]
R v. Laviolette [1987]
R v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd. [1988]
R v. Hydro-Quebec [1997] Lam(1)
R v. Vermette [1988]
R v. Kearney [1992]
Lac Minerals Ltd. v. Int. Nat. Corona Resources Ltd. [1989]
Hodgkinson v. Simms [1994] Sop(1)
Soulos Korkontzilas [1997] Sop(1)
Alberta Government Telephones v. C.R.T.C. [1989]
Ibew v. Alberta Government Telephones [1989]
Nelles v. Ontario [1989]
Proulx v. A.G. Quebec [2001] Dube(1)
United States v. Cotroni [1989]
McVey v. United States [1992] Sop(1)
United States v. Doyer [1993]
R v. M, (S.H.) [1989]
R v. L. (J.E.) [1989] For(1)-Dube(1)
Just v. British Columbia [1989]
Hollis v. Dow Coming Corp. [1995] Sop(1)
Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada [1990]
Stelco Inc. v. A.G. Canada [1990] Wil(1)-Sop(1)
Ref. Re Ss. 193 & 195.1 (1)(c) of the Criminal Code [1990]
R v. Stagnitta [1990] Wil(2)-Dube(2)
R v. Skinner [1990] Wil(2)-Dube(2)















R v. Martineau [1990]
R v. Rodney [1990]
R v. J. (J.T.) [1990]
R v. Lachance [1990]
R v. Durette [1994]
McKinney v. University of Guelph [1990]
Harrison v. University of British Columbia [1990] 
Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital [1990] 
R v. Andrews [1990]
Canada (Human Rights Comm.) v. Taylor [1990]
R v. Chaulk [1990]
R v. Ratti [1991]
Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1991]
Ref. Re Ng Extradition [1991]
C.B.C. v. Lessard [1991]
C.B.C. v. New Brunswick (A.G.) [1991]
R v. W. (D.) [1991]
R v. Haroun [1997]
R v. Seaboyer [1991]
R v. Osolin [1993]
R v. Esau [1997]
R v. Goltz [1991]
R v. Brown [1994]
R v. Genereux [1992]
R v. Forster [1992]
R v. Morin [1992]
R v. Sharma [1992]
R v. Kelly [1992]

























Symes v. Canada [1993]
Egan v. Canada [1995]
Thibaudeau v. Canada [1995]
R v. Bartle [1994]
R v. Prosper [1994]
R v. Pozniak [1994]
R v. Feeney [1997]
R v. Heywood [1994]
R v. Dunn [1995]
R v. St. Pierre [1995]
R v. Bunn [2000]
R v. Power [1994]
R v. Jacques [1996]
R v. P. (M.B.) [1994]
R V. G. (S.G.) [1997]
C.B.C. v. Canada (Labour Relations Board) [1995] 
Royal Oak Mines Ltd. v. Canada [1996]
R v. Silveira [1995]
R v. Goldhart [1996]
R v. O’Connor [1995]
R v. Wickstaed [1997]
R v. Robinson [1996]
R v. McMaster [1996]
R v. Lemky [1996]
R v. Van der Peet [1996]
R v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd. [1996]
Adler v. Ontario [1996]
Lavoie v. Canada [2002]
R v. Stillman [1997]

























Winnipeg Child & Family Services v. G. (D.F.) [1997] 
Dobson v. Dobson [1999]
Continental Bank Leasing Corp. v. Canada [1998] 
Continental Bank of Canada v. Canada [1998]
R v. Thomas [1998]




Aboucharv. Ottawa French Language School Board [1999]
Deschamps v. Separate School Board (Prescott-Russell) [1999] Maj(1)
Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co. [1998]
Trans. N. Am. Express Co. v. New Solutions Financial [2004]
R v. Brooks [2000]
R v. Charlebois [2000]
R v. Cinous [2002]
R v. D.D. [2000]
R v. Parrott [2001]
Town of Ajax v. C.A.W., Local 222 [2000]
City of Sept-lles v. Quebec (Labour Court) [2001]
R v. Oickle [2000]
R v. Tessier [2002]
R v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd. [2001]
C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour) [2003]
Housen v. Nikolaisen [2002]









Jehova Witness Con. St. Jerome-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine [2004] Bin(2)-LeB(2)
Arb(1 )-LeB(1 )-Des(1)
R v. M alm o-Levine [2003] 
R v. Clay [2003]
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Tables 4.8 -  4.12 summarize the total number of preferential and precedential votes 
for each Justice. There are seven Justices per table and five tables for a total of thirty-five 
Justices. The Justices were grouped together chronologically according to the order in which 
they appear in Table 4.7. The ensuing discussion will identify the significant findings and 
highlight some of the more noteworthy examples of preferential and precedential voting.
Table 4.8
Preferential and Precedential Votes by Justice
Preferences (%) Precedent (%)











Locke 1 5 16.67 1(100) 1(20) 2(40) 2(40)
J. W. Estey 4 1 80 2(50) 2(50) 1(100)
Cartwright 13 9 59.1 4(30.8) 2(15.4) 7(53.8) 5(55.6) 4(44.4)
Martland 8 4 66.7 4(50) 2(25) 2(25) 1(25) 3(75)
Kerwin 2 1 66.7 2(100) 1(100)
Rand 1 2 33.3 1(100) 2(100)
Fauteux 3 0 100 1(33.3) 2(66.7)
Totals 32 22 59.3 11(34.4) 10(31.2) 11(34.4) 8(36.4) 12(54.5) 2(9.1)
Table 4.8 presents the total number of preferential and precedential votes for Justices 
Locke, Estey, Cartwright, Martland, Kerwin, Rand, and Fauteux. Combined, these Justices 
voted according to their preferences in 59.3 percent of the progeny cases. Conversely, 40.7 
percent of the progeny votes are attributed to the influence of precedent. Justice Locke had 
the highest percentage of precedential votes, 83.3 percent versus 16.7 percent preferential. 
Locke J. changed his vote in five progeny, meaning that he acceded to the position from 
which he dissented in the precedent case. Justice Locke’s only preferential vote came in 
Archibald et al. v. Nesting et al,30, in which he dissented based on his earlier dissent from 
Marsden Kooler Trans. Ltd. et al. v. Pollock,31 Under the coding conventions used by Segal
30 Marsden Kooler Trans. Ltd. et al. v. Pollock, [1953] 1 S.C.R. 66.
31 Archibald et al. v. Nesting et al., [1953] 2 S.C.R. 423.
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and Spaeth, Locke’s vote in Archibald is classified as “strong preferential” since he referred 
to his dissent in the precedent case.
Justice Cartwright’s votes in Mann v. The Queen32 andMclver v. The Queen33 
provide excellent examples of “strong precedential” behaviour. The decisions in Mann and 
Mclver relied on the Court’s judgment in O ’Grady v. Sparling, a case dealing with the 
validity of provincial careless driving laws.34 Although Cartwright dissented in O ’Grady, he 
authored concurring opinions in both of its progeny which explicitly follow the majority 
opinion from O ’Grady. For this reason, Cartwright’s progeny votes were coded as “strong 
precedential.”
Table 4.9
Preferential and Precedential Votes by Justice
Preferences (%) Precedent (%)











Taschereau 0 1 0 1(100)
Abbott 2 1 66.7 1(50) 1(50) 1(100)
Spence 17 3 85 1(5.9) 11(64.7) 5(29.4) 2(66.7) 1(33.3)
Hall 3 0 100 3(100)
Judson 9 5 64.3 2(22.2) 3(33.3) 4(44.5) 1(20) 3(60) 1(20)
Ritchie 8 5 61.5 3(37.5) 2(25) 3(37.5) 1(20) 4(80)
Pigeon 4 2 66.7 1(25) 2(50) 1(25) 2(100)
Totals 43 17 71.7 8(18.6) 22(51.2) 13(30.2) 2(11.8) 13(76.4) 2(11.8)
The seven Justices presented in Table 4.9 voted consistently with their original 
revealed preference in 71.7 percent of the progeny cases, and acceded to the position 
established by precedent in the remaining 28.3 percent. To illustrate weak preferential voting, 
consider Justice Ritchie’s decisions in the progeny of Vinnal v. The Queen/ 5 Specifically, 
Ritchie participated in four negligence cases that either relied on, or raised similar issues to
32 Mann v. The Queen, [1966] S.C.R. 238.
33 Mclver v. The Queen, [1966] S.C.R. 254.
34 O’Grady v. Sparling, [1960] S.C.R. 804.
35 Vinnal v. The Queen, [1970] S.C.R. 502.
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those in V in n a lAlthough Ritchie J. did not cite his dissent from Vinnal, his votes in the 
first two progeny cases are consistent with the ideological direction of his vote in Vinnal, and 
are therefore coded as weak preferential.
Perhaps the best example of strong precedential behaviour is the concurring opinion 
of Justice Judson, which was joined by Spence J., in Lampard v. The Queen.37 Lampard is a 
progeny case of Sunbeam Co. Ltd. v. The Queen which was decided in the same year.38 
Justices Judson and Spence dissented in Sunbeam, only to accept it as a binding precedent 
shortly thereafter. In Lampard, Judson J. unequivocally stated that the doctrine of stare 
decisis “compelled” him to follow the majority opinion from Sunbeam 39 Although there are 
other examples of strong precedential voting, the concurrence of Judson J. and Spence J. in 
Lampard is the only case where the Justices openly attribute the decision to vote against their 
original revealed preference to the influence of precedent.
Table 4.10
Preferential and Precedential Votes by Justice
Preferences (%) Precedent (%)
Strong Moderate Weak Strong Moderate Weak
Justice Pref. Prec. % Pref. (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Laskin 13 3 81.3 2(15.4) 7(53.8) 4(30.8) 3(100)
Dickson 7 8 46.7 3(42.9) 3(42.9) 1(14.2) 6(75) 2(25)
de Grandpre 3 1 75 3(100) 1(100)
Beetz 1 7 14.3 1(100) 6(85.7) 1(14.3)
Lamer 6 6 50 5(83.3) 1(16.7) 3(50) 2(33.3) 1(16.7)
McIntyre 2 8 20 2(100) 2(25) 3(37.5) 3(37.5)
Le Dain 0 3 0 3(100)
Totals 32 36 47.1 10(31.2) 15(46.9) 7(21.9) 5(13.9) 23(63.9) 8(22.2)
36 The Queen v. Lupien, [1970] S.C.R. 263; Alexandra®v. The Queen, [1970] S.C.R. 753; Levesque v. 
Comeau et al., [1970] S.C.R. 1010; Perrault v. The Queen, [1971] S.C.R. 196.
37 Lampard v. The Queen, [1969] S.C.R. 373. [hereinafter, Lampard]
38 Sunbeam Co. Ltd. v. The Queen, [1969] S.C.R. 221.
39 Lampard, 382.
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The Justices featured in Table 4.10 are the only group that combined to produce more 
precedential than preferential votes. This group of Justices voted consistently with existing 
precedent in 52.9 percent of the progeny cases, while 47.1 percent of the votes conform to 
preferential voting. Justice Bora Laskin, who served on the Court for nearly fourteen years, 
eleven of which were as Chief Justice, had the highest proportion of preferential votes with 
81.3 percent. This is to be expected given Laskin’s reputation as a fiercely independent 
Justice who was often in dissent, especially in criminal law cases.40 Justice Laskin’s votes in 
the three progeny cases of Hogan v. The Queen are illustrative of this point.41 Hogan 
involved the right of individuals to retain counsel before submitting to a breathalyser. Laskin 
dissented in the three Hogan progeny cases, citing his original dissent in each.42
Justices Beetz and McIntyre stand out as having the largest proportion of precedential 
votes compared to the other Justices in Table 4.10. Justice Beetz voted according to 
precedent in 85.7 percent of the progeny cases, while McIntyre followed stare decisis in 80 
percent. In Ross Southward Tire v. Pyrotech Products, Justice Beetz dissented from the 
majority regarding the apportionment of liability following an accidental fire.43 The majority 
held that, under the terms of the insurance policy, the landlord could recover damages for a 
fire caused by the tenant.44 Justices Beetz and de Grandpre dissented, arguing that the 
insurance policy did not cover the fire, and that the landlord should seek damages from the 
tenant.45 However, Beetz accepted the majority judgment from Ross two years later in T.
40 See generally, J. Edwards, “Bora Laskin and the Criminal Law,” University of Toronto T aw Journal 35 
(1985): 325 -  352; Peter McCormick, “Follow the Leader: Judicial Power and Judicial Leadership on the 
Laskin Court, 1973 -  1984,” Queen’s Law Journal 24 (1998): 237 -  277.
41 Hogan v. The Queen, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574.
42 Rilling v. The Queen, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 183; Jumaga v. The Queen, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 486; The Queen v. 
Hamm, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 85.
43 Ross Southward Tire v. Pyrotech Products, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 35.
44 Ibid.
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Eaton Company v. Smith et a l46, and again two years after that, in Greenwood Shopping 
Plaza v. Beattie 47
Justice McIntyre’s votes in the progeny of R. v. Collins are prime examples of weak 
precedential behaviour. At issue in Collins was the admissibility of evidence under sections 
24 (1) and (2) of the Charter. Justice McIntyre dissented in Collins, arguing that although the 
search was unreasonable, the evidence should be admitted since its admission would not 
bring the “administration of justice into disrepute.”48 However, in three subsequent decisions 
based on Collins, McIntyre’s votes were consistent with the ideological direction of the 
majority opinion in Collins 49 Hence, Justice McIntyre’s votes in the Collins progeny are 
coded as weak precedential.
Table 4.11
Preferential and Precedential Votes by Justice
Preferences (%) Precedent (%)











Wilson 10 1 91 4(40) 4(40) 2(20) 1(100)
La Forest 4 2 66.7 4(100) 2(100)
W. Z. Estey 1 4 20 1(100) 4(100)
L’Heureux-
Dube 28 3 90.3 16(57.1) 12(42.9) 1(33.3) 2(66.7)
Sopinka 11 3 78.6 11(100) 2(66.7) 1(33.3)
McLachlin 15 1 93.8 8(53.3) 7(46.7) 1(100)
Cory 1 0 100 1(100)
Totals 70 14 83.3 44(62.9) 24(34.3) 2(2.8) 1(7.1) 12(85.8) 1(7.1)
46 T. Eaton Company v. Smith et al., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 749.
47 Greenwood Shopping Plaza v. Beattie, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 228.
48 R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265. Also see Justice McIntyre’s dissent in R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 
613.
49 R. v. Pohoretsky, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 945; R. v. Manninen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233; R. v. Dairy Supplies Ltd., 
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 665.
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The Justices in Table 4.11 combined to produce the second highest percentage of 
preferential votes, at 83.3 percent. The Justices conform to precedent in only 16.7 percent of 
the cases. Justice W. Estey is the only member of the group that appears to have been 
substantially influenced by precedent. Conversely, Justices Wilson, L’Heureux-Dube, and 
McLachlin rarely vote according to precedent. Although the data suggests that precedent has 
a very limited degree of influence on the votes of these Justices, an examination of their 
individual voting patterns reveals that they are among the most consistent members of the 
Court in terms of conforming to their past positions.
For example, consider the most frequent preferential voter, Justice L’Heureux-Dube. 
The results reported here support the findings of previous research, discussed in Chapter 
Two, that she consistently supports the position of equality rights claimants and opposes the 
position of criminal rights claimants.50 In her dissenting opinion from R. v. Martineau, 
L’Heureux-Dube J. voted to uphold the constructive murder provisions of the criminal code 
whereas the majority ruled that the provisions violated Section 7 of the Charter.51 She 
continued to oppose similar criminal rights claims in four progeny cases, citing her dissenting 
opinion from Martineau in each.52 Moreover, Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s propensity to 
support equality rights claimants is evident in the progeny cases of Symes v. Canada,53 
Overall, the results here regarding the ideological direction of Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s 
votes in progeny decisions demonstrate her attachment to preferential voting particularly in 
criminal rights and equality rights cases.
50 See James B. Kelly, “The Charter of Rights and the Rebalancing of Liberal Constitutionalism in Canada. 
1982-1997,” Osgood Hall Law Journal 37, no. 3 (1999): 680.
51 R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633.
52 R. v. Rodney, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 687; R. v. J. (J.T.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 755; R. v. Lachance, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 
3; R. v. Durette, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 469.
53 Symes v. Canada, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695. The progeny cases are Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513; and 
Thibaudeau v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627.
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Table 4.12
Preferential and Precedential Votes by Justice
Justice Pref. Prec. % Pref. (1) (2)
Gonthier 7 0 100 2(28.6) 5(71.4)
Major 4 0 100 3(75) 1(25)
Bastarache 3 1 75 2(66.7) 1(33.3)
Arbour 3 1 75 3(100)
Binnie 2 0 100 2(100)
LeBel 3 0 100 1(33.3) 2(66.7)
Deschamps 1 0 100 1(100)
Totals 23 2 92 12(52.2) 11(47.8)
Preferences (%) Precedent (%)
Strong Moderate Weak Strong Moderate Weak 




Although the number of progeny votes in Table 4.132 is substantially smaller than in 
Tables 4.8 -  4.11, the data fit into a pattern of increased preferential voting, particularly by 
the more recent Justices. Because they are relatively new to the Court, Justices LeBel and 
Deschamps have not participated in enough cases to make any conclusions as to whether they 
are influenced by precedent in their decision-making. However, if the past behaviour of other 
Justices is any indicator, it is reasonable to expect that considerations of stare decisis will 
have a minimal influence on their votes.
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Table 4.13
Combined List of Preferential and Precedential Votes by Justice
Preferences (%) Precedent (%)
Strong Moderate Weak Strong Moderate Weak
Justice Pref. Prec. % Pref. (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Locke 1 5 16.67 1(100) 1(20) 2(40) 2(40)
J. W. Estey 4 1 80 2(50) 2(50) 1(100)
Cartwright 13 9 59.1 4(30.8) 2(15.4) 7(53.8) 5(55.6) 4(44.4)
Martland 8 4 66.7 4(50) 2(25) 2(25) 1(25) 3(75)
Kerwin 2 1 66.7 2(100) 1(100)
Rand 1 2 33.3 1(100) 2(100)
Fauteux 3 0 100 1(33.3) 2(66.7)
Taschereau 0 1 0 1(100)
Abbott 2 1 66.7 1(50) 1(50) 1(100)
Spence 17 3 85 1(5.9) 11(64.7) 5(29.4) 2(66.7) 1(33.3)
Hall 3 0 100 3(100)
Judson 9 5 64.3 2(22.2) 3(33.3) 4(44.5) 1(20) 3(60) 1(20)
Ritchie 8 5 61.5 3(37.5) 2(25) 3(37.5) 1(20) 4(80)
Pigeon 4 2 66.7 1(25) 2(50) 1(25) 2(100)
Laskin 13 3 81.3 2(15.4) 7(53.8) 4(30.8) 3(100)
Dickson 7 8 46.7 3(42.9) 3(42.9) 1(14.2) 6(75) 2(25)
de Grandpre 3 1 75 3(100) 1(100)
Beetz 1 7 14.3 1(100) 6(85.7) 1(14.3)
Lamer 6 6 50 5(83.3) 1(16.7) 3(50) 2(33.3) 1(16.7)
McIntyre 2 8 20 2(100) 2(25) 3(37.5) 3(37.5)
Le Dain 0 3 0 3(100)
Wilson 10 1 91 4(40) 4(40) 2(20) 1(100)
La Forest 4 2 66.7 4(100) 2(100)
W. Z. Estey 1 4 20 1(100) 4(100)
L’Heureux-
Dube 28 3 90.3 16(57.1) 12(42.9) 1(33.3) 2(66.7)
Sopinka 11 3 78.6 11(100) 2(66.7) 1(33.3)
McLachlin 15 1 93.8 8(53.3) 7(46.7) 1(100)
Cory 1 0 100 1(100)
Gonthier 7 0 100 2(28.6) 5(71.4)
Major 4 0 100 3(75) 1(25)
Bastarache 3 1 75 2(66.7) 1(33.3) 1(100)
Arbour 3 1 75 3(100) 1(100)
Binnie 2 0 100 2(100)
LeBel 3 0 100 1(33.3) 2(66.7)
Deschamps 1 0 100 1(100)
Total 200 91 68.7 85(29.2) 82(28.2) 33(11.3) 17(5.8) 61(21) 13(4.5)
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Table 4.13 combines the data from Tables 4.8 -  4.12, and shows the total number of 
preferential and precedential votes. Eighteen of the thirty-five Justices voted according to 
their preferences in 68 percent or more of the progeny cases which corresponds to a high 
level of preferential expression. This confirms the first hypothesis that a majority of Justices 
exhibit strong levels of preferential behaviour. Although it is only a slight majority (51.2 
percent), the data are sufficient to accept the hypothesis that most Justices on the Supreme 
Court of Canada conform to their personal preferences more often than to precedents.
The Court’s overall support for precedent in progeny cases since 1950 stands at 31.3 
percent, which is considered a weak level of influence. In contrast, 68.7 percent of the total 
votes cast in progeny cases were consistent with the justices’ original revealed preference. 
Together, the weak level of precedential voting and strong level of preferential voting 
supports the expectation of the second hypothesis, which is that the decision-making of the 
Court as a whole is influenced more by the personal preferences of the Justices than by the 
doctrine of stare decisis.




In summary, the findings of the research reported here do not bear out the 
conventional wisdom that precedent has a substantial influence on the decisions of the 
Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada. While the content analysis shows that the Justices 
frequently use precedent and other variables associated with the legal model to justify their 
decisions, additional research proves that precedent has a minimal influence on how the 
Justices decide cases. In particular, an examination of precedent-altering judgments 
demonstrates that, with the exception of a few Justices, stare decisis rarely influences the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. The same conclusion holds true for ordinary cases 
where precedential influence was slightly greater than in precedent-altering decisions, but 
still low enough to be classified as having a weak influence on the Justices’ decisions. 
Accordingly, these results support the findings of American researchers that the attitudinal 
model provides a better explanation of how judges decide cases.
Interestingly, when the results from studies 2 and 3 are combined, the Justices with 
the highest rates of conformity to precedent were all appointed to the Supreme Court either 
by Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, or P.E. Trudeau. Specifically, Justices Martland and 
Judson were appointed by P.M. Diefenbaker in 1958, followed a year later by Justice Roland 
Ritchie. As Prime Minister, Trudeau appointed Justices Dickson, Beetz, and McIntyre to the 
Supreme Court between 1973 and 1979. Compared to the other members of the Court since 
1950, these six Justices were the most supportive of the legal model version of stare decisis.
In addition, these Justices are united by the fact that they were all appointed before 
the introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. Prior to the Charter era, the 
Supreme Court of Canada was regarded as an extremely conservative institution in that the 
Justices were reluctant to invalidate legislation or to disturb existing precedents. As the
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results of study 2 indicate, the number of precedent-altering decisions significantly increased 
following the entrenchment of the Charter. This suggests that the Charter brought about a 
change in how Supreme Court Justices view their role in society.
In the Charter era, the conservative conception of the judicial function has been 
replaced by one which emphasizes the need for judicial creativity and a greater willingness to 
pass judgment on the content of legislation. Thus, the relatively high rate of conformity to 
precedent demonstrated by Justices Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Dickson, Beetz, and McIntyre, 
may be, at least in part, a function of the conservative culture of Canadian law which 
prevailed throughout most of their judicial careers. This explanation is further supported by 
the declining rates of precedential influence among the Justices who were appointed after the 
introduction of the Charter.
The results reported here imply that precedent has a weak influence on the decision­
making of the majority of Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada. However, when 
compared to the findings of American researchers, the data reveal that the Court as a whole 
conforms to institutional stare decisis at a rate that is nearly three times higher than the U.S. 
Supreme Court. For example, Segal and Spaeth found that since 1960, the Justices on the 
U.S. Supreme Court switched their vote to the position from which they originally dissented 
in 9.2 percent of the progeny cases.1 Conversely, the Justices on the Supreme Court of 
Canada conformed to precedent in 31.3 percent of the progeny cases. Thus, from a 
comparative perspective, the Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada appear to be more 
influenced by institutional stare decisis than their American counterparts.
While this analysis has assessed the influence of stare decisis on judicial decision­
making, it has avoided making any normative claims regarding the desirability of adhering to
1 Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, “The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of United States Supreme 
Court Justices,” American Journal of Political Science 40 (1996): 983.
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precedent. Rather than arguing that judges should or should not follow precedent, it is limited 
exclusively to the question of influence. However, the growing incidence of preferential 
voting has serious implications for the principle of predictability. In particular, judges must 
ensure that they strike the proper balance between legal continuity and predictability, and the 
need to update the law by altering established precedents. Consequently, its purpose has been 
to test the conventional wisdom that precedent is the fundamental principle of judicial 
decision-making.2 While the results do not support the conventional wisdom, neither do they 
completely rule out the influence of precedent on judicial decision-making.
For this reason, additional research is needed into legal and attitudinal factors that 
affect judicial decision-making in Canada This, in turn, requires broadening the study of law 
beyond the traditional concern with legal rules to include an understanding of how 
personalities and preferences shape judicial decisions. Only when the mythology of judging 
is deconstructed and the barriers separating legal scholarship and the social sciences are 
removed, will it be possible to truly know whether the Justices on the Supreme Court of 
Canada take precedent seriously.
2 Ibid.. 971.
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